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1Bargaining Power in Relational Contracts:An Experimental Study y




This paper provides experimental evidence of the economic impact from shifting bargaining power in rela-
tional contracts. I implement an experimental design that adjusts the bargaining power of sellers (agents)
and the enforceability of the contract. I nd that the vast majority of contracts take the form of eciency
wage contracts instead of contingent performance contracts when enforcement is partially incomplete and
sellers have more bargaining power than buyers. The total contracted and actual compensation increase with
the bargaining power of the sellers. However, sellers' prots are found to increase only if a part of the total
payment is third-party enforceable. In this case, observed surplus and eciency are lower than predictions.
When no part of a contract is third-party enforceable, more cooperative relationships emerge, exhibiting
higher quality provision resulting in higher surplus and eciency while rent sharing is lower. The result is
explained by the stronger buyer's deviation, conrming predictions derived in Cordero Salas (2010). The
results here provide insight into the economic consequences of enacting policies that improve the bargain-
ing conditions of weaker parties in market settings relying on self-enforcement from underdeveloped legal
institutions.
Key words: contracts, incomplete enforcement, bargaining, experiments, distribution, institutions.
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1 Introduction
Contracts are a common way to coordinate economic relationships. However, contracts are often dicult
to enforce because some contract terms (e.g., quality, eort) are dicult for a court to verify and, in some
places, courts don't exist or won't intervene in privately negotiated contracts. Consequently, contracts can
be enforced only by the parties involved via the threat of ending the relationship. This leaves room for
signicant opportunism, which is enhanced when one of the parties has more market power because that
party can extract more of the contract's benets.
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2This research explores the consequences for eciency, cooperation and distribution of trade surplus of
shifting power in relational contracts with dierent enforcement regimes through interventions such as the
formation of a bargaining group for the side with less power (sellers) in a market where a group (buyers)
has market power.
Theory previously developed in Cordero Salas (2010) suggests that, depending on the enforcement
regime, a shift in bargaining power may not achieve better economic results for the weaker party because
the stronger counterparty may no longer want to continue contracting. The group who lost power may
now nd the short-term benets of reneging on contractual promises is larger than the long-term benets of
faithfully executing a contract where they hold less power. However, such a collapse in good-faith execution of
contracts in the light of such a power shift may not occur if other changes take place, such as the enforcement
of some minimum payment for contract participation. This study explores these theoretical predictions using
experimental economics.
I implement four treatments in which subjects played a game with an uncertain number of periods
and the parts of the contract (i.e. xed component of payment, discretionary payment and quality) that
were exogenously enforced by the experimenter or the bargaining power that subjects are able to exercise
diered.
The observed behavior in the experiments supports many hypothesis derived from Cordero Salas
(2010) while it also presents results that contrast with the predictions of that model.
Buyers oer more attractive contracts to sellers when sellers can exercise bargaining power. This is
specially true when contract enforcement is completely absent. When contracts are not enforceable at all
and bargaining is in place, subjects trade using contracts that create the highest level of surplus, suggesting
that parties nd informal incentives to maintain a higher eciency in the absence of enforcement, which
supports the strategic ambiguity theory of Bernheim and Whinston (1998).
When partial enforcement is in place subjects use more eciency wage contracts when bargaining
is in place and more performance contracts when bargaining is not possible as predicted. Eciency wage
contracts are not only used to avoid shirking but to minimize the use of bargaining, while in the absence of
bargaining, contracts are only structured to provide incentives to avoid deviations. Furthermore, contract
acceptance rates are lower when bargaining is allows, suggesting that parties use counteroers when they
have the option and they feel that the contract oered is not giving them enough rents. However, sellers
use more counteroers when enforcement is in place supporting the argument that participants are more
comfortable exercising bargaining power when they have part of the payment enforced.
3The observations also present unexpected results regarding cooperation. Surprisingly, subjects achieved
the highest level of cooperation among all treatments when contract enforcement was completely lacking and
bargaining was an option which contradicts the model predictions. This result suggests that sellers exercised
less bargaining power than was available in this treatment. Although a higher eciency and total payments
were observed under these conditions, sellers did not get a signicantly hilgher payo or signicantly greater
share of the surplus. This is explained by the stronger buyer's deviation and lower seller's deviation observed
when cooperation was not the outcome. This behavior was deeper when contracts were reached through
counteroers suggesting that buyers also punish sellers for exercising their bargaining power.
In contrast, when partial enforcement was in place bargaining allowed sellers to achieve higher payos
and a greater share of the surplus. Although eciency outcomes were not signicantly dierent relative to
other treatments, they were the lowest in absolute terms suggesting that there might be a trade-o between
distributional and eciency outcomes.
The distributional outcomes suggest that if the goal of improving bargaining position of the weaker
party is to increase their share of the surplus, then shifting bargaining power needs to be complemented
by the implementation of formal enforcement at least the base price . However, if the goal is to improve
eciency when contract enforcement is incomplete, the results give evidence that implementing bargaining
increases eciency if contract enforcement is lacking.
2 Experimental Design
I implement four treatment conditions in order to examine how bargaining aects the formation of self-
enforcing agreements and parties' reciprocal actions in the marketplace. Each experiment is a repeated
game of indenite duration mimicking the innitely repeated game in the theoretical model developed in
Cordero Salas (2010). The experiments were programmed using the Z-TREE software (Fischbacher, 1999)
and took place on networked computers.
The treatments dier in the parts of the contract (i.e. xed component of payment, discretionary
payment and quality) that are exogenously enforced by the experimenter or the bargaining power that
subjects are able to exercise. The continuation probability and matching protocol were identical across
treatments and the ecient outcome can be supported as an equilibrium in all treatments except in one
(the NEBP treatment, to be described momentarily). The subjects were matched into pairs and interacted
anonymously with each partner through the computer terminals. There was no possibility of contagion
4eects among treatments because subjects play one single game with dierent partners. A commonly known
probability of continuation controlled for subjects' belief about the possibility of future interaction. The
subjects earned a show-up fee plus additional earnings that were proportional to the points earned during
the experiment. The exchange rate was 50 experimental points per $1 which ensured that subjects had
incentives to increase their points earnings.
The supergame: The basic experimental platform is based on the design of Brown, Falk, and Fehr
(2004) and Wu and Roe (2007a,b) and each treatment implements a particular specication of the theoretical
model in Cordero Salas (2010). The supergame consists of an innite market interaction between sellers and
buyers achieved by the implementation of a random continuation rule. Buyers and sellers use contracts to
establish the terms of trade for one unit of a good of quality Q that is exchange for a total payment that
may include a base price, p, and a discretionary payment (bonus) that depends on the quality delivered,
b(Q). Buyer earnings are increasing in quality and decreasing in the total payment; the opposite occurs to
sellers' earnings. In each trading period, subjects can only trade one unit of a good. The price and quality
of the good traded determine how much money each trading party makes during a trading period.
Matching procedure: Subjects were matched into pairs by using a rotation matching scheme. In each
session, subjects were randomly divided into two groups: buyers and sellers. In each match, every buyer
subject was paired with seller subject and subjects were not paired with each other in more than one match.
Moreover, the pairing was done in such a way that the decisions made by one subjects in one match could
not aect in any way the pairs' decisions that she or he meet in the future. These features were explained
to the subjects. Because subjects were matched with each other only once, the total number of possible
matches per session is N=2, where N is the number of subjects attending a session.
Innite Repeated Games: In each treatment, a random termination rule was used to induce innitely
repeated games. The probability of continuation used was  = 4=5 and was the same for all treatments. In
each trading period the supergame is expected to go on for 5 additional periods.1 This was done by having
the computer drawing a number between 0 and 1, using a uniform distribution. The supergame terminated
if the computer drawn was 0.81 or a higher number. This randomization mechanism generates a innitely
repeated game because there is always a possibility of interacting with the same subject in the next future
round. The probability of continuation allows us to control for the subjects' beliefs regarding the probability
of continuation as subjects played a game with an uncertain number of trading periods. Because of the
random termination rule, each supergame may have dierent number of periods but all supergames have
1The expected number of periods of a game with a continuation probability of  is equal to T = 1
1 . Therefore, with
 = 4=5 the expected number of periods each pair interacts equals 5 periods.
5the same expected duration of ve rounds. Then, each experimental session may be formed of one long-
duration supergame or various short-duration supergames of the same treatment depending on the random
termination rule. In addition, the computer drawn number could serve as a public randomization device as
in all sessions participants observed the same drawn number.
Implementation of the bargaining: To implement the dierence in bargaining power in the experiment,
the design included two dierent conditions. The rst condition was treatments in which buyer made a take-
it-or-leave-it oer to the seller who could only accept or reject{ in essence an ultimatum game. In the second
conditions, the seller was able to make a counteroer if rejected the buyer's oer{an alternating oer game
with two oers and a asymmetric cost for delaying trade for each party.
Treatments: I implemented two enforcement conditions and two bargaining conditions. The rst
condition, which I call partial contract enforcement condition with no bargaining (PENBP), implements
an ultimatum game in which the buyer makes take-it-or-leave it oers to the seller and the seller, upon
acceptance, could choose any feasible quality irrespective of the contractually agreed upon level. The buyer
could also choose any feasible level of bonus but he has to pay a base payment that is exogenously enforced by
the experimenter. The second condition, which I call partial contract enforcement condition with bargaining
(PB), implements an alternating oer game with two oers in which the seller is able to counteroer the buyer
one time after he has made the rst oer. The base payment is also exogenously enforced by the experimenter
while all other variables in the contract are not enforced. The third and fourth conditions, which I call the
fully incomplete contract condition with no bargaining (NN) and the fully incomplete contract condition
with bargaining (NB), implement the ultimatum game and the alternating oer game from the PN and PB
conditions respectively, but in these two treatments the base payment is not exogenously enforced by the
experimenter either, therefore the buyer has the latitude to adjust the total payment to zero. That is the










Enforced terms Price Price None None
Figure 1: Summary of treatment conditions
Stage Game: The stage game in all treatments have two phases: a negotiation phase and a trading
6phase. In the negotiation phase parties negotiate to reach an agreement about the terms of the contract
including a desired quality of the good, Q; a price for the good, P, and a bonus, i.e. a payment contingent
on quality delivered b(Q). The set of feasible quality levels is given by f1;2;:::;10g and prices and bonus
can be in the set given by f1;2;3;:::;100g. In the trading phase parties make choices about some or all
contract terms ex-post and the choices may dier from the contract terms previously agreed depending on
the contract enforcement treatment.
In the negotiation phase of the treatments with no bargaining, buyers have all bargaining power and
each buyer makes a take-it-or-leave-it-oer to his matched seller. The seller decides to accept or reject the
contract. If the seller accepts, the pair moves to the trading phase. If the seller rejects, the pair does not
trade in that period. In contrast, in the treatments with bargaining, if the seller subject rejects the oer,
she can oer a contract (counteroer) to the matched buyer. In this case, the buyer gets to accept or reject.
If the buyer accepts, the pair moves to the trading phase. If the buyer rejects, the pair does not trade in
that period.
The trading phase is divided in two additional sub phases: quality determination and payment deter-
mination. Quality is discretionary in all treatments, then the quality determination phase is the same for all
partial enforcement (PE) and fully incomplete enforcement (NE) treatments and sellers can choose ex post
any quality from 1 to 10. The payment determination phase diers from the PE to the NE treatments. In
the PE treatments, price, P, is binding and the computer ensures that the price specied in the contract is
paid, which ranges between 0 and 100. In the NE treatments the computer does not enforce P; however, in
both treatments buyers can choose any bonus ranging from 0 to 100 after observing the quality. Therefore, a
subject buyer in the NE treatments can adjust the total payment to zero while in the PE treatments have to
pay the contracted price. Once all decisions are made, payments are made and each party receives payos.
Figure 2 summarizes the sequence of the stage game.
Stage Game Payos: The stage game payos dier among bargaining and no bargaining treat-
ments. In the bargaining treatments, I include in the payo functions the parameter  from the model
in Cordero Salas (2010). The parameter reects the bargaining power which in the traditional alternat-
ing oer game is the cost of delaying trade. In the experiments it serves as a way to transfer bargaining
power between players by not only giving the opportunity to the seller to counteroer but also by inicting
an asymmetric cost of delay for parties. I consider the following stage game payo functions for the no
bargaining treatments (PN and NN).
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10Q   p   b(Q) if contract was concluded






p + b(Q)   5Q if contract was concluded
5 if contract was not concluded
In the bargaining treatments (PB and NB), payo functions include a  = 0:9, which is equivalent to
the discount factor in the alternating oer game with two potential oers (original oer and one counteroer),
and it reects the level of impatience or cost of delay for the player who makes a counteroer (seller). If a
buyer gets a counteroer, he can accept but he only receives the prots multiplied by 0:1. However, he can
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10Q   p   b(Q) if contract was concluded when rst oered
(0:1)(10Q   p   b(Q)) if contract was concluded under a counteroer




> > > > <
> > > > :
p + b(Q)   5Q if contract was concluded when rst oered
0:9(p + b(Q)   5Q) if contract was concluded under a counteroer
5 if contract was not concluded
The outside option of a seller who does not trade is 5 while for the buyer it is zero. The cost schedule
for all sellers is given by 5Q. All buyers and sellers in the same treatments face the same payo parameters
in all experimental sessions.
Payo functions, the cost schedule and the termination rule were common knowledge. However, only
the pair of traders involved in each transaction were informed about the actual payos and quality level
delivered. Therefore, parties could only build a reputation with the partner with whom they were trading.
At the end of each trading period, each participant is informed about the contract (p;b(q);q) he had
concluded, the actual quality delivered, q, the payment made, his own payment, as well as about his trading
partner's payo and ID number.
Subjects' total earnings: All payos were in points. At the end of each session, the points earned by
each subject were converted into dollars at the exchange rate of 50 points= $1. Subjects were paid privately
the equivalent of points earned plus the money resulting from a pre-experimental gamble that the subjects
had the option to play by using their show-up fee of $8. Note the resolution of this gamble did not occur
until the end of the session.
Order of Treatments: Subjects could participate in only one session and each subject played only a
single treatment with one or more dierent partners. Therefore, there was no possibility of spillover eects
from one treatment to another.
Sessions and Procedures: At the beginning of each session participants were randomly assigned to
the role of either a buyer or a seller. These roles were xed for the duration of the session. Each buyer
was paired randomly with a seller. Each pair played an uncertain number of trading games. Then I could
observe R = T N=2 trades per game, where N is the number of subjects participating in the session and T
is the number of periods played in each game.
The experiment consisted of sessions with one single treatment run per session and dierent groups
of subjects participating in each session. Each treatment was run in four sessions except the PB treatment,
which was run in ve sessions. Each session consisted of a trial unpaid game, two surveys, a control question-
naire and the paid treatment. The treatment was run one to six times, where the number of times depended
9on the results of the random termination rule and the time left after each termination. Each match consisted
of as many rounds as the continuation rule indicated. All sessions last between one and half and two hours
depending on the random termination rule.
Each participant participated in one session only, and at check in subjects were assigned a random ID
number to preserve anonymity. Each subject was randomly assigned to a networked computer and was told
that they will participate in a computerized trading experiment.
Throughout the pre-experimental activities subjects neither received feedback about their decisions
nor information about other subjects' decisions. They were not informed about their own payos until the
end of the experiment. Subjects were informed about these procedures, and they were also aware that their
decisions in the pre-experimental activities were completely independent of the trading game.
After the pre-experimental activities, instructions for the main treatment were read aloud for both
buyers and sellers and each subject was given a printed copy for reference. When instructions were read,
subjects did not know whether they had been assigned to be buyers or sellers. Reading instructions took
approximately ten minutes. In addition, subjects answered a computerized control questionnaire formulated
to test understanding of the treatment. In order to help the subjects to understand the game structure, the
questionnaire contained hypothetical situations in the game from the perspective of both roles, buyers and
sellers, and the correct answers were provided afterwards. The trading game did not start until all subjects
understood the game.
To ensure that all subjects understood the game, after completing the control questionnaire, subjects
were assigned randomly to be sellers or buyers, and participated in two practice rounds. The practice rounds
were identical to normal rounds with the exception that no money was earned. Practice rounds had the
purpose of familiarizing subjects with the computer controls and screens. Subjects were not able to see
actual choices or payments in order to avoid possible deception.
Once the practice periods were over, the real periods of the game started. Each subject received
a $5 balance in their account (250 experimental points). Because of the random termination rule, some
experiments were longer than others and if the experiment ended prior to the allotted time for the evening's
session, then additional games were played until the allotted time expired. For each new game, subjects were
matched with a dierent partner.
Each subject had an identication number for the role (IDR), e.g. buyer 1, seller 5 which was xed
during each contracting game allowing subjects to keep track of trading partners. In this way, participants
could observe that they traded with a dierent partner after termination and rematching. This information
10was available only in the main treatment and not in the practice rounds.
Once all games were over, subjects were asked to complete an exit survey while experimenters deter-
mined payouts. Finally, subjects were paid privately.
3 Theoretical Predictions and Hypothesis
The theoretical predictions are derived from the model developed in Cordero Salas (2010). The analysis
is based on the assumption that market participants are self-interested, risk-neutral utility maximizers and
that this is common knowledge. Additionally, contract enforcement is assumed to be either partially or
fully incomplete. Incomplete means that some (partial) or all (fully) contract terms are not veriable by a
third-party (e.g. courts).
In all conditions, the probability of trading for one more period with the same partner is 80 per cent
or  = 4=5; the expected number of periods that each pair interacts is 5. Furthermore, given the parameters
chosen, the socially ecient level of quality is Q = 10 because marginal revenue (10) is greater than marginal
cost (5) for all quality levels. Finally, I dene cooperation as both parties fullling the contract, the seller
supplying the contracted quality and the buyer paying the contracted payment. The degree of cooperation
in each treatment is dened as the proportion of pairs that cooperated.
3.1 First Best Prediction
When contracts are fully enforceable and a third-party can verify quality, parties can explicitly contract on
quality. When the buyer holds all bargaining power, the rst-best outcome in each period is for the buyer to
oer a contract (55;10) and for the seller to accept the contract and supply the highest possible quality, 10,
in exchange of a payment of 55. This contract generates the maximum joint surplus of 50, which is allocated
among the parties according to the contract. That is the seller gets prots of 5 (equal to his outside option)
and the buyer collects the rest of the surplus with prots of 45.
When bargaining occurs such that the seller holds a bargaining power of 0:9, the rst-best outcome in
each period is for the buyer to oer a contract (95;10) and the seller to accept the contract. This contract
also generates the maximum surplus but in this case the buyer gets prots of 5 and the seller gets the rest
of the surplus.
113.2 Prediction for the PN Treatment
In the PN treatment, there is no bargaining and contracts are partially incomplete, e.g. the experimenter
only enforces the price. Therefore, for the single-stage game the buyer can guarantee the seller will receive
the price. As a consequence the seller only supplies the minimum quality, q = 1 and the buyer pays a price
just high enough to induce seller's participation: p = 10. In this equilibrium the joint surplus created is 5,
where the buyer earns 0 and the seller earns 5 (equal to the outside option).
In the repeated game, the model predicts that players care not only about the single-stage game
outcome but the stream of future payos they can achieve with the same partner. Therefore, in a repeated
interaction with incomplete enforcement, players cooperate for several periods contingent on the satisfactory
performance of the present trade. Cooperation is the desirable action and it is dened as both parties
fullling the contract. A deviation from the desirable outcome is followed by a sanction which translates into
breaking-o trade forever. In these experiments, this grim trigger strategy translates into buyers choosing to
not oer contracts to sellers after observing a deviation or sellers rejecting contracts after observing a buyer's
deviation. This strategy is extreme and could be substituted in the experiment by participants continuing
to trade under less favorable conditions. In this case, players behave as in the single-stage game in which
the buyer pays 10 points, the seller supplies a quality of 1 and the total surplus created is 5.
Because of the ongoing interaction the buyer can promise a payment contingent on quality as parties
will likely trade again in the next period. Following the model in Cordero Salas (2010), a discount factor
equal to 1=2 or higher sustains cooperation under this regime. Therefore, the ecient outcome can be
sustained as a sequential equilibrium in the PN treatment because the continuation probability implemented
in the experiments mimics a discount factor higher than the threshold for cooperation, ( = 4=5 > 1=2).
The ecient outcome in each period is for the buyer to oer a contract requesting the highest quality
10, in exchange of a price of 10 and a bonus of 45. Both parties cooperate, the seller by supplying the highest
quality and the buyer by paying the bonus. Parties cooperate because the payos from cooperative behavior
are greater than or equal to the payo from deviation (from the dynamic incentive compatibility constraint:
225  90 for the buyer and 25  25 for the seller). These results are summarize in the following predictions.
Prediction 1. In the PN treatment, the buyer oers a contract including a quality of 10, a price of 10 and
a bonus of 45 with a total payment of 55.
Prediction 2. In each period, the ecient outcome is sustained through cooperative actions. The actual
quality equals 10 and the maximum surplus of 50 is achieved. The buyer receives a payo of 45 while the
12sellers' payo equals the outside option of 5.
Prediction 3. Cooperation is observed in every period.
3.3 Prediction for the PB Treatment
In the PB treatment, contracts are also partially incomplete but sellers can counteroer. In the single-stage
game, the buyer can only promise the price and because the seller can counteroer and demand a higher
price (p  9:5Q2). However, because for any price the seller maximizes her income by providing the lowest
quality, q = 1, the buyer oers only a contract for the minimum quality and pays a price just enough to
induce seller's participation. The buyer oers a price of 9:5 in exchange for a quality of 1. Given this quality,
the seller's outside option of 5 is greater than the seller's bargained share of the surplus of 4:5. Therefore,
exchange does not take place in the one shot game.
In the repeated game, players cooperate to maximize the stream of payos. As in the PENBP
treatments, cooperation is sustainable for discount factors greater than or equal to 1=2. Therefore, the
prediction for the PEBP treatments is that in each period the ecient outcome is sustained given the
continuation probability of 4=5 implemented in the experiments. The buyer oers a contract that takes into
account the bargaining power that the seller can exercise. The optimal contract includes the highest quality
of 10 in exchange of a price of 95 and a bonus of 0. Given the seller's bargaining power, the seller is the
residual claimant of the surplus. The dynamic incentive compatibility constraint shows that even though
the seller has the opportunity for deviation given the payment structure, she is better o by cooperating
than deviating as 225 > 110. Although the buyer does not have much room for deviation, he is better o by
cooperating as he gets a higher payo by cooperating than deviating as 25 > 5. The results are summarized
in the following predictions.
Prediction 4. In the PB treatment, the buyer oers a contract in which the requested quality equals 10, the
price equals 95, the bonus equals 0 and the total payment is 95.
Prediction 5. In each period, the ecient outcome is sustained through cooperative actions. The actual
quality equals 10 and the maximum surplus of 50 is achieved. The buyer receives a payo of 5 while the
sellers' payo equals 45 as a result of the distribution of bargaining power.
Prediction 6. Cooperation is observed in every period.
2In the one-shot game, the buyer can only promise the xed price. This reduces the seller's participation constraint to
p   5Q  0:9(10Q   5Q). Then, solving for p, it results in p  9:5Q
133.4 Prediction for the NN Treatment
In the NN treatments, the experimenter does not enforce any of the terms of the contracts, including the
price. In this case, buyers can adjust the total payment to zero after observing the quality delivered while the
sellers can choose any quality they desire. For the single-stage game, a buyer cannot promise any payment
to the seller. As a consequence, for any quality the seller supplies, the buyer maximizes payos by choosing
a total payment equal to zero. The seller anticipates this action and realizes that regardless of the contract,
for any quality she supplies, she earns less than her outside option, U = P(Q) 5Q = 0 5Q < 5. Therefore
the seller would not accept any contract and trade does not occur.
In the repeated game, the ongoing interaction sustains the ecient outcome for discount factors equal
to or greater than  = 11=20 = 0:55. Given the probability of continuation in the experiments of  = 4=5,
cooperation is sustainable in every period.
The equilibrium contract oered by a buyer subject includes the highest possible quality, 10 and a
total payment of 55; the contract generates the highest surplus of 50. Note that because neither of the
components of a payment are enforceable the structure of contracts can vary substantially. However, given
that the subjects are given the option to structure a payment with price and bonus, the theoretical structure
may be similar to the one in the PN with a price of 10 and the bonus of 45. The buyer's per period
payo equals 45 and the seller's payo equals 5. Finally, participants should nd cooperation to be more
protable than deviation as these parameters result in the following relationships from the dynamic incentive
compatibility constraint, 225 > 100 for the buyer and 25 > 15 for the seller. The results are summarized in
the following predictions.
Prediction 7. In the NN treatments, the buyer oers a contract where the total payment equals 55 and the
requested quality equals 10.
Prediction 8. In each period, the ecient outcome is sustained through cooperative actions. The actual
quality equals 10 and the maximum surplus of 50 is achieved. The buyer receives a stage payo of 45 while
the sellers' stage payo equals the outside option of 5.
Prediction 9. Cooperation is observed in every period.
3.5 Prediction for the NB Treatment
In the NB treatment, a seller can exercise bargaining power by using counteroers while none of the terms of
the contract are enforced by the experimenter. In the single-stage game there is no trade following the same
14intuition as in the stage game of the NN treatment. In this case, even with the sellers exercising bargaining
power and requesting higher prices, the buyer always maximizes his payos by withholding the full payment.
Therefore, the seller rejects any contract and no trade takes place.
Given the parameters used in the experiment, cooperation sustains the ecient outcome if the discount
factor is equal or greater than  = 19=20. Therefore, the continuation probability of  = 4=5 implemented
in the NB treatment does not sustain cooperation if the sellers exercise all their bargaining power. If sellers
exercise all their bargaining power, the buyers have to oer a contract where the total payment is such that
P(Q)  9:5Q. For example, for the ecient quality of 10, the buyer has to propose a contract where he oers
to pay a total payment of 95. In this case, the buyer's discounted payo from cooperation equals 25 while
the discounted payo from deviation equals 100. Therefore, the buyer shirks and takes short-term prots
instead of staying the long term relationship. This situation happens for any given quality if the seller claims
a payment such that P(Q)  9:5Q because the buyer's dynamic incentive compatibility constraint reduces
to
10Q 9:5Q
0:2  10Q + 0 ) 0:5Q  2Q which is not possible. Then, for any given quality, the buyer gets a
higher payo from deviating.
If sellers do not exercise all bargaining power, cooperation can be sustained by increasing the buyer's
stage payo from cooperating. Increasing the buyer's payo from cooperation can be done by the seller
accepting a lower price which is equivalent to exercising less bargaining power. That is the seller claims less
of the surplus that he could. I derive the bargaining power exercised threshold by using the buyer's DICC
from Cordero Salas (2010), which translates to
10Q 5Q 5Q
0:2  10Q ) 3=5  . Then, if the seller only
exercises a bargaining power equivalent to 0:6 by accepting a contract with a total payment of P(Q) = 8Q,
then cooperation is sustained and the ecient outcome is achievable. Optimal contracts oer a payment of
80 in exchange for a quality of 10. The buyer's stage payo equals 20 and the seller's stage payo equals 30.
Prediction 10. In the NBP treatment, if the sellers exercise all available bargaining power the ecient
outcome is not sustained. The buyers take short term prots and deviation is observed in every period.
Prediction 11. If sellers exercise bargaining power of 0.6 or less (by accepting lower prices), the ecient
outcome is sustainable. The seller accepts a contract where the total payment equals 80 and the requested
quality equals 10. The ecient outcome is sustained through cooperative actions, the actual quality equals
10, and the maximum surplus of 50 is achieved. The buyer receives a stage payo of 20 while the sellers'
stage payo equals 30.
Prediction 12. Cooperation is observed in every period when sellers exercise a bargaining power of   0:6.
153.6 Hypothesis
Comparing the above predictions, I forward testable hypotheses with respect to eciency, distribution and
cooperation. The model describes eciency as maximizing the social surplus by trading the highest level of
quality. Then, the ecient outcome is dened as q = 10 and surplus equal to 50. Furthermore, in equilibrium
in the no bargaining treatments sellers accept the oer and both parties cooperate while in the bargaining
treatments the buyer oer the equilibrium contract of the alternating oer game such that the seller does not
have an incentive to counteroer. Then, sellers accept the rst oer and cooperate unless the seller exercises
bargaining power greater than 0:6 in the NB treatment.
All treatments have the same expected relationship length (same probability of continuing with the
same partner in the following period), therefore the eect of the termination rule should be the same across
treatments except when sellers exercise a high bargaining power in the NB treatment. In the latter case,
the expected length of the relationship given by the termination rule should have a negative impact on
cooperation.
Buyers maximize prots by requesting the ecient level of quality in all treatments. In the no
bargaining treatments (PN and NN) the buyer is the potential residual claimant of the surplus while in the
bargaining treatments (PB and NB) the seller is. Then, in all treatments at least one party has the incentive
to maximize surplus. Therefore, the contracted quality should be 10 in all oered contracts. Furthermore,
the same level of quality and total surplus maximizes participant discounted prots in all treatments as the
expected length of the relationship is the same. The only expected dierence across treatments is in the NB
treatment where surplus declines if the seller desires to exercise maximal bargaining power. In this case, the
buyer would maximize prots by withholding payments for any quality, therefore no exchange is expected.
Then, contracts oering a total payment higher than 80 should be rejected in the NB treatment.
Moreover, the oered payments are the same for both no bargaining treatments but these dier from
the payments oered in the bargaining treatments. Within the bargaining treatments the contracted total
payment is higher in the partial enforcement condition than in the fully incomplete enforcement condition.
The explanation is that in the NB treatment the seller is better o exercising only enough bargaining power to
reap the highest possible surplus while sustaining long-term cooperation instead of exercising full bargaining
power and triggering opportunistic behavior by the buyer, which results in short-term gains and reservation
payo thereafter. Finally, the oered bonus decreases as the seller's bargaining power increases. Therefore,
the structure of the contracted payment is indeterminate in the full incomplete enforcement conditions while
it diers within the partial enforcement treatments with a higher contracted bonus and a lower contracted
16base price under no bargaining and the opposite under bargaining. The following hypothesis summarize
these observations with respect to contract terms.
Hypothesis 1. Contracted quality should reach maximal levels under all treatments.
Hypothesis 2. The total contracted p will follow: PB  NB > PN = NN.
Hypothesis 3. The contracted base price is greater in PB than PN and the opposite is true for the contracted
bonus. If sellers exercise a high bargaining power in the NEBP, any contract is oered and rejected.
Once the buyers have made their oers, sellers are more likely to accept buyers' oers in the no
bargaining treatments because those are take-it-or-leave-it contracts. In the bargaining treatments, the
sellers have the option of using a counteroer, then the acceptance rate is expected to be lower. Moreover,
within the bargaining treatments, sellers are able to exercise more bargaining power in the partial enforcement
condition than under the fully incomplete condition because the base payment is enforced by the experimenter
so that it is secure for the seller. Then, the sellers counteroer more in the PEBP treatment than in the
NEBP treatment.
Hypothesis 4. The acceptance rate of contracts is higher in no bargaining treatments (NN and PN) than
in the bargaining treatments (NB and PB).
Hypothesis 5. Sellers counteroer more in the partial enforcement (PB) than in the fully incomplete (NB)
condition.
As soon as parties agree on the contract, the seller has to decide on the level of quality to supply and the
buyer, after observing the quality supplied, has to make decisions about payments. The outcomes of eciency
and distribution of surplus depend on these decisions and the level of cooperation in the experimental
economies. However, cooperation or deviation is triggered initially by the contracted terms of trade. Under
the parameters in the experiment, the model predicts that a buyer should oer the minimum payment for
participation to the seller in the no bargaining treatments. Under these conditions participants have sucient
incentives to cooperate and achieve the ecient outcome. Furthermore, cooperation and full eciency are
achievable under PEBP treatments even when the seller demands the maximum payment to collect all
surplus. In this case, the incentives are such that both participants also cooperate and achieve the ecient
outcome. This outcome is also observed in the NEBP treatment if the seller accepts a lower payment than
the necessary to extract all the surplus.
17As the seller's bargaining power increases, the buyers' ability to induce high quality through the
discretionary payment decreases because it is bounded by his limited gains from trade. But in this case
the sellers are less sensitive to the performance payment, as through higher bargaining power they become
residual claimants of the surplus. As a consequence, the level of quality that sellers provide increases
and seller deviation from contracted quality decreases with sellers' bargaining power. Then, actual quality
should be higher and seller deviation should be lower in the bargaining treatments than in the no bargaining
treatments. Furthermore, in the bargaining treatments, the gains from trade (private surplus) dier from
the social surplus more in the partial enforcement treatment than in the fully incomplete condition. The
explanation for this is that sellers feel more comfortable in using counteroers in the partial enforcement
condition because the base price is enforced by the computer. In addition, because the base payment
is enforced by the experimenter, sellers shirk more in partial enforcement treatments than in the fully
incomplete enforcement treatments.
The model also predicts that in all treatments, buyers nd incentives to cooperate given the parameters
implemented in the experiment. The model only predicts that buyers deviate in the NEBP treatment if the
seller attempts to extract all surplus. The exercise of bargaining power in this condition can erode market
eciency because a buyer's long-run gains to trade shrink and short-term opportunistic behavior becomes
more appealing for the buyer, then the buyer deviates and trade is more likely to break down. Furthermore,
buyer deviation from the contracted payment is increasing with the seller's exercise of bargaining power
because his payos decrease. Therefore, buyers shirk more under the bargaining treatments than in the no
bargaining treatments and buyer deviation is always observed for contracts oering a payment higher than
80 in the NB treatment. In addition, because buyers have more means to deviate in the fully incomplete
enforcement treatments (by adjusting the full payment to zero), then buyers shrink more under this condition
than when partial enforcement is in place. Following this analysis I draw the following hypothesis with respect
to eciency, surplus and cooperation:
Hypothesis 6. More cooperative outcomes are observed in PEBP, PENBP and NENBP treatments than in
the NEBP treatment.
Hypothesis 7. Actual quality chosen and social surplus should follow NB  PB > NN > PN if sellers
only exercise the bargaining power that allows parties to trade in the NB treatment. If sellers exercise too
much bargaining power actual quality and surplus in the NB is the lowest.
Hypothesis 8. Total payments follow PB > NB > PN  NN and the actual base payments are greater
18in PB than PN while the opposite is true for the bonus.
Hypothesis 9. There is a higher loss of private eciency in PB than NB.
Following parties' decisions, payments are made. In the no bargaining treatments, seller rents are
closer to their reservation payos while buyers extract all surplus. As sellers bargaining power increases,
sellers and buyers share rents more equally. If sellers use all bargaining power, they extract all rents leaving
buyers with a payo of zero in the PEBP condition. The next hypothesis summarizes this.
Hypothesis 10. Seller rents are close to reservation payos in the no bargaining treatments and their share
of the surplus is close to zero. Seller rents and the share of the surplus follow PB  NB > PN  NN.
Finally, cooperation breaks down when either participant deviates from the relational contract. After
either party's deviation, parties can punish their partners by terminating the relationship (no exchange even
when contract terms are favorable) or by continuing trading on less favorable terms. The model predicts
that participants cooperate in all periods in all treatments except in the NB treatment when the seller
exercises all bargaining power. But after any deviation, the model predicts that parties go back to play
the one-shot game, in which trading the lowest quality for a minimum payment is the equilibrium for the
PENBP treatment and no exchange is the equilibrium for all other treatments. The last hypothesis states
this.
Hypothesis 11. After any deviation, parties trade under less favorable terms in the PN treatment while no
exchange takes place in all other treatments.
4 Results
To date I have run 17 sessions. Table 4 summarizes information about the experimental sessions. Subjects
were OSU undergraduate and graduate students from a variety of majors that were recruited by email and
earned an average of $16.61 with a maximum $32 and a minimum of $6. There were 297 distinct pairs that
interacted in the experiments with a maximum of 87 in the NN treatment and a minimum of 56 in the PN
treatment. Table 4 presents the average number of periods per match. Mann-Whitney tests give evidence
that the number of periods played per match is signicantly dierent among some treatments. Because of
this dierence I control for the length of the relationship in the econometric analysis.
Tests for learning eects. Because the experiments mimic the innite repetition of the theoretical
model, the realized durations varied considerably. Past literature has shown that subjects learn through-
19Session Treatment (Date) Number of Number of Number of Total number
Subjects games pairs of periods
1 NEBP (09 27 10) 6 3 9 11
2 NENBP (09 29 10) 6 3 9 13
3 PEBP (10 05 10) 8 1 4 9
4 PENBP (10 11 10) 8 1 4 16
5 NEBP (10 12 10) 12 3 18 10
6 PEBP (10 13 10) 10 5 25 16
7 NEBP (10 26 10) 10 5 25 18
8 NENBP (10 26 10) 10 5 25 19
9 PENBP (10 28 10) 8 3 12 25
10 NENBP (11 02 10) 10 5 25 22
11 PEBP (11 02 10) 10 5 25 20
12 PENBP (11 03 10) 8 4 16 18
13 NEBP (11 03 10) 12 3 18 17
14 PEBP (11 09 10) 12 3 18 14
15 PENBP (11 09 10) 12 4 24 22
16 PEBP (11 10 10) 12 2 12 19
17 NENBP (11 10 10) 14 4 28 26
Total 168 56 297 295
Average 9.88 3.29 17.47 17.35
Table 1: Experimental Sessions
NB NN PB PN
3:86a 4:71b 4:88a;b 6:75
Notes: Dierent letter superscripts indi-
cate that numbers are statistically dis-
tinct.
Table 2: Average number of periods per match
out the experiment. In this case, subjects' behavior may be substantially dierent from the theoretical
equilibrium in earlier periods, however, over time subjects adjust their choices and converge to the theoret-
ical equilibrium. As a consequence potential dierences across treatments may be due to learning eects,
especially between those that have signicantly dierent length.
To explore if this is an issue, I perform some test for learning eects. First, I test learning eects by
comparing subjects' decisions across the games played in each single session across treatments. I aggregated
pairs from all treatments by game number, where game number describes the order in which a specic game
that included a unique pair was played 3. Table 4 shows the mean values per game across treatments for
the most relevant variables including contracted and delivered quality and payment, prots, cooperation
and surplus. A Kruskal-Wallis test indicates that there is a statistically signicant dierence across games
3Because the use of a random termination rule, one or more games were played in each sessions. Then, the game number
represents the order in which the game was played in a session(rst, second, third, etc.).
20Variable Game 1 Game 2 Game 3 Game 4 Game 5
Av. contracted quality 7:53a 7:58a;b 8:37c 8:58c;d 7:89b;c;d
Av. actual quality 6:08a 5:53a;b 6:89c 7:68d 6:63c;d
Av. contractual payment 58:09a 59:05a;b 63:83c 63:88c;d 64:43c;d
Av. actual payment 44:33a 40:34a;b 49:75c 55:21d 50:84c;d
Av. seller's payos 13:89a 12:46a;b 15:17a;c 16:77c;d 17:66c;d
Av. buyer's payos 15:02a 13:66a;b 17:34a;c 21:38d 12:78b;c
Cooperation rate 0:36a 0:32a;b 0:44a;c 0:53c;d 0:40b;c;d
Av. Surplus 30:40a 27:63a;b 34:47c 38:42d 33:13c;d
Notes: Numbers within a row with dierent letter superscripts are statistically distinct. Dierences
among games are statistically signicant at 1% or 5% levels.
Table 3: Mean values per game across treatments
for at least one game for all variables in table 4. A Mann-Whitney test of pairwise dierences identies
no signicant dierence among game 1 and game 2 for any of the variables. However, the same test gives
evidence of a signicant dierence between some of the other games (superscripts in Table 4). This evidence
suggests that subjects' earlies behavior diers somewhat to later behavior. Therefore, learning and outcomes
trends may be important in analyzing the data.
The gures in table 4 suggest that subjects became more familiar with the incentive structure of
the indenite repetition across games in the same sessions, and they responded by increasing eciency and
cooperation. Figure 4 shows the learning trend in cooperation between games across treatments. Participants
increase cooperation from the rst two games to the later games. Even though cooperation is lower in game
5, it is not statistically dierent than cooperation in game 4. However, the dierence in cooperation among
games is only signicant at 5% level.
I also test each individual treatment for learning eects. Only the fully incomplete enforcement
treatments present some signicant increasing dierences among games for desired quality, actual quality,
desired total payment, cooperation and surplus. This evidence suggests that the small learning trend observed
in the overall analysis is driven by the no enforcement treatments, especially by the NN treatment where
learning trends are signicant at the 1% level for almost all variables.
To test more consistently the presence of learning eects, I compare the means of the variables of
interest among early and later periods across treatments and for each treatment. If learning eects are
present, then subjects learn the incentives in the game and respond better in later periods. Because each
game has a potentially dierent number of periods that each match plays, I dene an \eective period"
variable which is the number of actual periods that each subject plays in a full session across games and
21Figure 3: Average cooperation across games in all treatments
across partners. I analyze learning eects by comparing subjects' earlier decisions to later decisions within
a single session. For each treatment, the data was partitioned into two groups by using three dierent
denitions of \early periods" and \late periods". For that I created three learning variables. The rst,
\learning5", denes early periods as the rst 5 periods of a session and later periods as all other periods.
That is \learning5" equals 0 if period  5 and equals 1 otherwise. In the same way, \learning4", equals 0 if
period  4 and equals 1 otherwise. And nally, \leraning9" denes early periods up to the ninth period.
The analysis gives evidence of learning trends in subject behavior. As in the previous analysis of
learning eects, the presence of learning eects is stronger in the N treatments than in the P treatments,
especially under \learning9". Therefore, I control for learning eects in econometric analyses.
A nal consideration is the dierence in the number of periods played among games. In the NB
treatment the longest game had 9 periods while in the NN, PB and PN treatments the longest game had
17, 12 and 20 periods respectively. I test for potential dierences among treatments because of the presence
of longer games. I created a variable called \laterperiods" that takes the value of 0 if the period played was
between 1 and 9 (taking as reference the longest game in the treatment that had the shorter longest game
(NB)), and 1 if the period was 10 or beyond. By using the pooled data for all treatments, I nd a signicant
dierence in the total payment(MW test p= 0.0410), sellers' prots (MW test p=0.0604) and cooperation
(MW test p=0.0102). When I analyze the dierences among sessions for individual treatments, I only nd
signicant dierences in the NN treatment. Therefore, I include all observations in the analysis and I control
22for potential dierences due to longer games by including dummy variables for each period.
Summary statistics. Table 4 presents the summary statistics by treatment. The unit of analysis is a
pair per period. There were 1493 possible interactions, of which 934 resulted in exchange. There were 1669
contracts proposed (1450 oers, 219 counteroers). Oer % shows the proportion of possible interactions
in which a buyer made an oer. Acceptance rate % shows the proportion of those oers accepted by the
seller. Counteroer shows the proportion of all possible interactions that resulted in a counteroer and
counteroer after rejection shows the proportion of rejected oers that were followed by a counteroer.
Counteroer acceptance rate shows the proportion of those counteroers accepted by buyers. Number of
pairs shows the number of distint subjects pairs. Average length of the relationship shows how many periods
each pair interacted. Pairs used oer % and Pairs used counteroer % show the proportion of pairs that used
oers and counteroers respectively while Pairs contracted by oer % and Pairs contracted by counteroer
% show the proportion of pairs that agreed on a contract by using oers or counteroers respectively.
The remaining variables in Table 4 are restricted to the actual contracts that were accepted including
oers and counteroers. Average contracted quality and Average contracted payment show the averages
specied in the accepted oers and counteroers, while Average actual quality and Average actual payment
show the averages actual delivered by both the seller and buyer respectively. Average buyer payos and
Average seller payos and Median seller payos are the average and median seller earnings in points per
period. Overall seller share and Overall seller share (median)show the mean and median proportion of the
private surplus (sum of parties' payos) captured by the seller including all contracts respectively, while
Seller share if oer and Seller share if counteroer show the proportion of the surplus captured by the seller
when the contract was reached by an oer or counteroer respectively. Trunc. seller share is similar to
overall seller share but it truncates the ratio of payos to total available private surplus to the unit interval.
In this case, if the payo of either party is negative, the share is set to 0 and the other party's share is set
to one. Payos relative spread presents another way of looking at surplus distribution. It is the ratio of the
spread between buyers' and sellers' payos to the total available private surplus. Finally, the Cooperation
rate shows the overall average cooperation while Cooperation rate if oer and Cooperation rate if counteroer
show the average cooperation when the contract was achieved through an oer and counteroer respectively.
The descriptive statistics in Table 4 give a general idea of the overall results. The data show that
buyers used almost all opportunities to make oers to their sellers. In addition, only around 50% of sellers
that rejected an oer used a counteroer in the NB treatment while close to 80% of sellers used counteroers
after rejection in the partial enforcement treatments.
23NB NN PB PN
All possible interactions
Possible interactions 285 426 414 368
Oer fraction 0.98 0.97 0.98 0.95
Acceptance rate fraction 0.53 0.60 0.53 0.69
Counteroer 0.24 na 0.37 na
Counteroer after rejection 0.32 na 0.50 na
Counteroer acceptance rate 0.18 na 0.18 na
Number of pairs 70 87 84 56
Av. Length of relationship 4 4.7 4.9 6.75
Pairs used oer fraction 1 0.99 0.94 1
Pairs used counteroer fraction 0.50 na 0.73 na
Pairs contracted by oer fraction 0.80 0.86 0.95 0.96
Pairs contracted by counteroer fraction 0.63 na 0.56 na
Completed exchanges
Av. contracted quality 8.57 8 7.71 7.79
Av. actual quality 7.51 6.41 6.05 6.33
Av. contractual payment 66.64 61.71 60.49 57.94
Av. actual payment 49.94 44.57 48.77 46.58
Av. buyer's payos 20.90 19.57 9.63 16.75
Av. seller's payos 12.39 12.50 18.15 14.91
Median seller's payos 20 15 18 15
Av. Surplus 37.53 32.07 30.26 31.67
Priv. surplus 32.29 27.79
Overall seller's share 0.24 0.54 1.19 0.84
Overall seller's share (median) 0.50 0.43 0.61 0.50
Seller's share if oer 0.31 0.54 1.30 0.84
Seller's share if counteroer -0.16 na 0.75 na
Truc. Seller's share 0.43 0.38 0.64 0.50
Payos relative spread 0.16 0.30 -0.97 -0.60
Cooperation rate 0.49 0.36 0.38 0.41
Cooperation rate if oer 0.54 0.36 0.39 0.41
Cooperation rate if counteroer 0.26 na 0.35 na
Treatment Eects
Bargaining Yes No Yes No
Enforcement None None p p
Table 4: Summary data
24Table 5 presents the averages by treatment for the variables of interest and the non parametric analysis
for key pair-wise treatment dierences. The signicance is measured by the p-values of the two-sided Mann-
Whitney tests using each partnership-period as an independent observations. I examine the results in more
detail by using hypothesis tests and regression analyses in the following sections and account for potential
clustering of unobservables at the partnership level.
4.1 Contracts terms
Hypothesis 1 predicts that all contracts should specify the same level of contracted quality, and that this
quality should be the ecient and highest allowable level (10) under all treatments. Comparing the treat-
ments I nd that the contracted quality is signicantly higher in the NB treatment compared to the NN
and PB treatments contradicting hypothesis 1. However, I cannot reject that QNN = QPB = QPN which
supports hypothesis 1. These results suggest that the NB contracts aim to create a higher level of surplus
than the other treatments by specifying a higher desired quality. However, a Wilcoxon test rejects the null
hypothesis that QNB is signicantly dierent from the highest quality, 10 (p=< 0:0000). I test QNB = 10
separately from the other treatments as the earlier non-parametric analysis rejected equality in the con-
tracted quality between NB and the other treatments. I pool data from the other three treatments as their
contracted quality means are not signicantly dierent from each other from the previous non-parametric
analysis. The Wilconxon test also yield a p-value < 0:0000, therefore the contracted quality is lower than
the ecient level in all treatments. By the same token, the average quality contracted is much higher than
the predictions of low quality in the one shot game (p=0.0000).
Although these results do not support the theoretical predictions about contracted quality, they are
consistent with previous experimental results. For example, Wu and Roe (2007b) found in their experiments
that buyers did not ask sellers to provide the ecient quality level. In their case, the lower level of contracted
quality might be a consequence of the nite horizon of the games implemented.The current experiment
simulates an innitely repeated game, via an uncertain ending period. This suggests the existence of a nal
period is not necessary to generate contracted quality levels below optimal.
Hypothesis 1 also states that the contracted total payment should be higher in the bargaining treat-
ments (PB and NB) because sellers can bargain. Moreover, the contracted total payment should be greater
in the PB treatment than in the NB because the base price is enforced, which gives sellers a chance to request
a higher payment. Although the average contracted total payment in the bargaining treatments are higher





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































PE & NE 7.18 59.79
PB 7.15 54.67
NB 7.22 69.63
Table 6: Contract terms in accepted contracts
analysis gives evidence of a signicant dierence only among the fully incomplete enforcement conditions.
In addition, I nd that the total contracted payment in the NB treatment is greater than in the PB, which
contradicts the predecited direction. Finally, the average of the total contracted payment diers from the
predicted equilibrium values in all treatments (NB, 66:64 vs. 80; NN, 61:71 vs. 55; PB 60:49 vs. 95; PN,
57:94 vs. 55).
Result 1. Contract terms are dierent in the NB treatment when comparing to the other treatments. How-
ever, the contracted quality and total contracted payment dier signicantly from the predicted values.
One explanation for these deviations from predictions is that buyers oer contracts with more attrac-
tive average payments in the bargaining treatments to avoid a possible counteroer from the seller, especially
in the NB in which buyer credibility is a more important issue because of the lack of enforcement. If bar-
gaining explains the higher contracted payments there should be no dierence in the contracts oered or
counteroered across enforcement conditions. Table 6 shows the average contracting terms by bargaining
and no bargaining treatments and by oers and counteroers in the bargaining treatments.
Comparing the contract terms in the bargaining treatments with the ones in the no bargaining con-
ditions I nd that the contracted total payment is signicantly higher under bargaining at the 5% level
(MW p=0.0258) while the contracted quality is not signifcantly dierent (MW p=0.1629). Furthermore, the
contracted quality and total payment were signicantly higher in the fully incomplete enforcement condition
than in the partial enfocement condition when bargaining was in place (MW test p=0.0015 and p=0.0001,
respectively). This evidence suggests that the dierence in the contract terms between the NEBP condition
and the other treatments is not driven by only the presence of barganing but the combination of bargaining
27and the level of enforcement.
To explore further if bargaining drives signicantly higher contract terms, I compare terms presented
in oers and in counteroers by using the pooled data of the bargaining treatments. A Mann-Whitney test
nds that the average quality requested and the contracted total payment in the oers were signicantly
higher than in the counter oers (p=0.0007 and p=0.0228, respectively). Furthermore, both terms are
signicantly higher in the NB treatment than in the PB treatment (p=0.0037 and p=0.0011 respectively)
but only the contracted payment was somewhat dierent in the counteroers (p=0.0206 for contracted
payment and p=0.9369 for contracted quality) between enforcement conditions.
The dierence in contracted quality among oers and counteroers in the data from both bargaining
treatments is driven mostly by the dierence in the NB treatment (MW p=0.0026) and not that much by
the dierence in the PB treatment (MW p=0.0768). The the dierence in the contracted total payment is
driven exclusively by dierences in PB (MW p=0.0103) as there is no dierence in the contracted payment
between oers and counteroers in the NB treatment (MW p=0.8113). The dierence in contract terms
across the PB and NB conditions in both oers and counteroers supports the observation made above: it
is the combination of bargaining and the lack of formal enforcement together that explain higher contracted
quality and higher contracted payments. In the NB treatment, buyers may feel the need to trade by using
more attractive contracts to overcome not only seller bargaining but also the threat of shirking. The more
attractive the contracts are, the lower are the incentives for deviation. These results are conrmed by the
econometric analysis in Table 7.
In addition, hypothesis 1 states that contracted prices will be greater in the PB than in the PN
treatment and the opposite is true for the contracted bonus. I examine the dierence in contracted payment
structure by comparing them among bargaining treatments within the same enforcement conditions (PEBP
and PENBP treatments). In the fully incomplete treatments (NE), subjects had the same options about
payment structure in terms of choosing how much to pay as a price and as a bonus, but there were no
dierences among these choices as neither the price no the bonus were enforced by the computer. Therefore
the subjects' choice is ambiguous in the NE treatments because participants could structure contracts in
many dierent ways without any conclusive reason for why a subject chooses one over the other. In contrast,
in the partial enforcement treatments the price was enforced by the computer while the bonus was not;
28Contracted quality Contracted Total Payment
Regressors Coe./Std Error Coe./Std Error
Constant 7.0512*** 51.7688***
(0.4642) (3.1929)
NB dummy 0.9614** 9.3746***
(0.3992) (3.2124)
NN dummy 0.3176 4.6166
(0.4314) (2.8245)
PB dummy 0.2710 4.3997
(0.4295) (2.7761)
Length of relationship -0.0739 -0.3520
(0.1079) (0.7606)
Buyer previous earnings 0.0376*** 0.1608**
(0.0085) (0.0656)
Seller previous earnings 0.0395*** 0.3767***
(0.0096) (0.0828)
F(1, 720) statistic for equality 3.51* 2.97*
of NB and NN coecients p=0.0614 p=0.0855
F(1, 720) statistic for equality 3.78* 2.97*
of NB and PB coecients p=0.0523 p=0.0853
F(1, 720) statistic for equality 0.02 0.01




Pseudo R2 0.0264 0.0134
Log pseudolikelihood -1656.0215 -3149.1848
Notes: Asterisks indicate the signicance level of the estimate: * at 10% level, ** at 5% level and ***
at 1% level. Both models are Censored estimations. Contracted quality regression had 11 left-censored
observations at 1 and Contracted total payment regression had 1 left-censored observation at 2. Sample
excluded observations for rst period interactions. Additional controls included dummy variables for
each period. Standard errors reported are robust and adjusted for clustering on buyer-seller pairs.
Table 7: Censored estimation for actual contract terms
29therefore subjects that oered a contract with a higher price are looking for a payment that serves as a
more formal incentive and that is more secure than a payment based on informal incentives (dependent on
outcomes).
In the partial enforcement conditions, sellers are more willing to accept contracts with higher prices
and lower bonuses in comparison to contracts with lower prices and higher bonuses because the price is
enforced by the computer. Such contracts give a sense of security about total payment. In contrast, buyers
nd contracts with a higher bonus and a lower price more appealing because they insure them against
defaulting sellers. In the bargaining treatments, however, buyers are more willing to oer contracts with
high prices than contracts with large bonuses with the objective to avoid counteroers from the sellers.
Table 4 shows that for accepted contracts the average contracted price under the PB treatment is
signicantly higher than the average contracted price under the PN treatment while the opposite is true for
the bonus. In the bargaining treatment, 69% of all contracts oered were structured with a higher price
than a bonus and 73% of the accepted contracts had also the same payment structure. In contrast, in the no
bargaining treatment, only 53% of all oers and 62% of accepted contracts were strucutured with a higher
price than bonus. The use of this structure in the no bargaining treatment was lower than the use in PB,
but still higher than the theoretical prediction of 0%. A Mann-Whitney test indicates that the proportion of
contracts with a higher price than bonus is signicantly higher in the PB treatment than in the PN treatment
for all oers and r the sample of accepted oers (p=<0.000 and p=0.0093 respectively), supporting the
theoretical preidction of the use of this structure when bargaining.
These results reect how the change in the institutional environment aects the choice of contract
structure. Buyers in the bargaining treatment lose full control over the structure of contract oered, as sellers
have the opportunity to counteroer. In this case, the buyers have to anticipate what a seller's counteroer
will be, and oer a contract that provides enough incentives to the seller not only to perform but also to not
use a counteroer.
To further investigate the eect of bargaining on payment structure I analyze the acceptance rate for
each type of contract structure. Table 4.1 presents this analysis. If contracts are structured by buyers to
have higher prices than bonuses, then sellers are more likely to accept. This holds for both PB (59% vs.
41%) and PN (81% vs. 56%). Among seller's counteroers the reverse is true; the acceptance rate is higher
for contracts where the bonus exceeds the price (33% vs. 43%). Although the dierence is not signicant.
In addition, Table 4.1 presents the results for comparing within-treatment outcomes for buyers who
choose contract structures with higher prices than bonus and those buyers who did not. Table 4.1 also
30Contract with Contract with Mann-Whitney
higher price than bonus higher bonus than price (p-value)
All oers
PEBP 0.59 0.41 0.0002
PENBP 0.81 0.56 < 0:000
All counteroers
PEBP 0.33 0.42 0.4396
PENBP NA NA NA
Table 8: Acceptance rate by contract structure
N Actual Buyer's Seller's Surplus
Quality Payo Payo
All contracts oered by buyers
PB
With higher price than bonus 150 6.88 12.7 21.7 34.4
With higher bonus than price 64 4.09 9.30 11.17 20.47
Mann-Whitney (p-value) < 0:000*** 0.0009*** < 0:000*** < 0:000***
PN
With higher price than bonus 151 6.64 15.53 17.65 33.18
With higher bonus than price 92 5.84 18.76 10.42 29.19
Mann-Whitney (p-value) 0.068 0.9476 < 0:000*** 0.0680*
All contracts oered by sellers (counteroers)
PB
With higher price than bonus 44 6.48 1.33 17.18 32.39
With higher bonus than price 8 3.88 0.51 12.83 19.38
Mann-Whitney 0.0286** 0.1471 0.6648 0.0286**
Table 9: Eects of contract structure
presents the outcomes for contracts established by counteroers. The p-values show the results of a Mann-
Whitney hypothesis test regarding the dierence between contracts with these structures within each treat-
ment.
In the PB treatment, contracts that are structured with higher prices than bonuses perform better
than contracts where bonuses exceed prices. This latter performance includes greater social surplus and
greater payos for each party. These dierences are statically signicant in all case except for buyer and
seller payos in counteroers. In the PN, surplus and seller's payos are signicantly greater for contracts
where price exceeds bonus, though buyers are no better o.
A comparison of oers in the bargaining and no bargaining treatments suggests that buyers generally
chose the contract structure that would improve their potential payo. The use of higher price than bonus
in the PN and the use of the opposite structure in the PB was greater than what what was predicted. To
study this more in detail, an econometric analysis is performed.
Table 10 presents the results of a probit estimation in which the dependent variables are the probability
that an accepted contract was structured with a higher base price than a bonus. The sample was restricted
to only the partial enforcement treatments as only in those treatments is there a dierence in choosing either
31contract structure as explained above. The explanatory variables include a dummy variable that takes a
value of one if the treatment was a bargaining condition and zero if it was take-it-or-leave-it condition and
controls for pair history including length of the relationship and buyer's and seller's past earnings as well as
controls for learning eects (with dummies for each period) and session-day dummies.
The bargaining coecient is signicantly positive. The marginal eects imply that subjects partici-
pating in bargaining treatments had a 37% higher probability of trading with a contract that was structured
with a higher pricee than a bonus than did treatments without bargaining. These results support the hypoth-
esis that contracts are more likely to take the form of wage contracts than contingent performance contracts
in the presence of bargaining.
Result 2. Contracts observed in the presence of bargaining are more likely to take the form of wage contracts
than performance contracts.
Note that from the estimation in Table 10, it seems that the use of contracts with higher prices than
bonuses is decreasing over time. Figure 4.1 pictures the use of this structure over periods for both the PEBP
and PENBP treatments. The use of this structure is decreasing in the PEBP treatment, however with
exception of period 8 and 12, at least 50% of contracts were structured with a higher price than bonus. In
the case of the PENBP treatment, the use of this structure is also decreasing and much lower than in the
PEBP treatment. Something interesting to note is that in later periods, the proportion of contracts with
higher prices than bonuese is higher, which might be a signal of rent-sharing given relational contracts in
the PENBP treatment.
(a) PEBP treatment (b) PENBP treatment
Figure 4: Evolution of contract structure
32Probit estimation Marginal Eects
Regressors Coe./Std Error Coe./Std Error
Constant 0.5191* 0.9023
(0.2710) (0.2710)
Bargaining dummy 1.1031*** 0.1991***
(0.4178) (0.0733)
Length of relationship 0.2229** 0.0385
(0.0941) (0.0197)
Bargaining * Length relationship -0.1740** -0.0300**
(0.0730) (0.0109)
Buyer previous earnings -0.0183** -0.0032*
(0.0082) (0.0017)





Notes: The dependent variable takes a value of 1 if the contract structure is such as the price is
higher than the bonus and zero otherwise. The sample was restricted to only partial enforcement
treatments and excluded observations for rst period interactions. Asterisks indicate the signi-
cance level of the estimate: * at 10% level, ** at 5% level and *** at 1% level. Estimation is a
probit. Standard errors reported are robust and adjusted for clustering on buyer-seller pairs.
Table 10: Probability of accepted contract structures with higher price than bonus
334.2 Acceptance rate, use of counteroers and cooperative outcomes
Hypothesis 2 states that the the acceptance rate of contracts is higher in no bargaining treatments than
in the bargaining treatments while sellers counteroer more in the partial enforcement than in the fully
incomplete condition.
The acceptance rate also reects the parties' willingness to engage in a trading relationship and
cooperate. Table 5 shows that the oers acceptance rate among bargaining treatments is not dierent from
each other. However, the acceptance rate in the no bargaining treatments is higher than the corresponding
bargaining treatment and in the case of partial enforcement, the dierence is signicant at the 1 % level while
in the case of no enforcement regimes the dierence is signicant at the 10% level. Yet, by comparing the
overall acceptance rate in the fully incomplete conditions (including oers and counteroers), the dierence
is more signicante (5% level). This evidence gives some support to the idea that no bargaining treatments
describe a higher rate of trades relative to the total number of oers made.
Table 4 shows the use of counteroers in the bargaining treatments. Fifty percent of sellers that
rejected an oer sent a counteroer to the buyer in the PEBP condition while only 32% did in the NB
(Mann-Whithey test p=0.0003) which supports hypothesis 2.
A probit model estimating the probability of accepting the contract and of the use of counteroers
conrm that bargaining decreases the acceptance rate while enforcement increases the use of counteroers.
More importantly, table 11 presents the determinants of the acceptance rate and the use of counteroers.
Explanatory variables include the terms of contracts in the oers, a dummy variable for bargaining, a dummy
variable for enforcement (for the acceptance rate estimation only), controls for parties' previous history and
period dummies to control for learning eects.
The higher the base price oered the higher the probability of accepting the buyer's oer and the lower
the probability that a counteroer is observed. The same reasoning applies to the performance bonus however
the coecient is not signicant in either estimation. Bargaining decreases the probability of acceptance
supporting the non-parametric results and hypothesis 2. Finally, even though the coecient for enforcement
is positive in the use of counteroer estimation, it is not signicant. These results are summarized as follows:
Result 3. The acceptance rate is lower and the use of counteroers is higher in the presence of bargaining.
However the use of counteroers is not signicantly dierent across bargaining treatments.
34Probability of Probability of Probability of Probability of
acceptance acceptance counteroer counteroer
Regressors Coe./Std Error Coe./Std Error Coe./Std Error Coe./Std Error
Constant -0.0464 -0.6684*** -0.8564** -0.0475
(0.1506) (0.2104) (0.4046) (0.5031)
Bargaining dummy -0.2802*** -0.2997***
(0.0960) (0.1029)
Enforcement dummy 0.0874 0.2786** 0.4090** 0.3370*
(0.1021) (0.1082) (0.1761) (0.1832)
Contracted quality 0.0145 0.0557
(0.0264) (0.0493)
Contracted price 0.0127*** -0.0266***
(0.0041) (0.0069)
Contracted bonus 0.0016 -0.0124**
(0.0041) (0.0063)
Length of relationship -0.0019 0.0070 0.1946 0.1364
(0.0428) (0.0422) (0.1871) (0.2214)
Buyer previous earnings 0.0179*** 0.0140*** -0.0113** -0.0046
(0.0032) (0.0034) (0.0047) (0.0049)
Seller's previous earnings 0.0291*** 0.0249*** -0.0093* -0.0029
(0.0043) (0.0044) (0.0051) (0.0052)
Observations 1156 1156 534 534
Log pseudolikelihood -715.72457 -696.72943 -318.71962 -299.74677
Pseudo R2 0.0865 0.1108 0.0481 0.1048
Notes: Estimation are probit models with a dummy that takes value of 1 if the contract was accepted or counteroer was used
respectively and zero otherwise as dependent variables respectively. Asterisks indicate the signicance level of the estimate:
* at 10% level, ** at 5% level and *** at 1% level. Adiditional controls are current lengh of the relationship, buyer's and
seller's payos and dummies for each period. Standard errors reported are robust and adjusted for clustering on buyer-seller
pairs. Both estimations use subdata for only oers made by buyers. Dada excludes observations for rst period interactions.
In addition, estimation for probability of counteroers limits data to bargaining treatments.
Table 11: Determinants of contract acceptance and counteroer use
35One possibility is that subjects may learn throughout the experiment and move toward the equilibrium
oer. In the bargaining game, the proposer makes an equilibrium oer such that it gives the receiver the
same expected payo as if were to counteroer. One learning trajectory might be that subjects that use
counteroers more often in the rst periods and decrease their use as the oer approaches the equilibrium
oer. Figure 5 shows the percentage of pairs per period that used counteroers and the sellers' potential
average prots derived from rst oers4. The % of counteroers decreases over time while the potential
sellers' prots oered some what increase over time. These trends suggest that sellers get more attractive
terms in rst oers over time. Buyers oered a potential higher payo to the seller so that she does not use
the counteroer. Because of these more attractive gains from trade, sellers used counteroers in a decreasing
fashion. This is the mechanism through which bargaining power aects the distribution of surplus. I explore
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Figure 5: Number of counteroers and potential sellers' prots in oers
Furthermore, the acceptance rate for oers per period is consistent with the results discussed above.
Figure 6 shows the share of oers accepted from period one to period nine in each treatment. The acceptance
ratio is not dierent from the earlier periods (1-5) to later periods (6-9) (Mann Whitney test p-values above
4The potential prots are scaled to a range between zero and one such by dividing potential prots by 100, so that they can
be plotted in the same graph as the percentage of pairs that used counteroers.
360.1489). In the rst three periods the acceptance rate of the no bargaining treatments is higher than the
acceptance rates in the bargaining treatments (0.72 vs. 0.42, MW p=< 0:00). However, starting in period
four acceptance rates decrease in the no bargaining treatments. This may be consistent with the fact that
subjects knew that the expected number of periods is ve; buyers may have oered less attractive contracts
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Figure 6: Share of trades accepted per period
The acceptance rate in the bargaining treatments increase slightly from period one to period ve, which
is consistent the the decrease in the number of counteroers made in the same periods as shown in gure
6. This result may be explained by the bargaining equilibrium explained above which is also complemented
with the low acceptance rate of counteroers. Figure 6 shows that the counteroer acceptance rate decreases
over time in the NB treatment and is generally lower than the acceptance rate of rst oers.
4.3 Eciency and Welfare
Eciency is measured by the level of actual quality delivered, which maps directly into the surplus generated.
All treatments have the same expected time horizon, therefore, parties should achieve the same surplus and
quality levels in all treatments if relational contracts persist in the NB treatment.
37Hypothesis 4 states that if relational contracts arise sellers provide higher quality in the bargaining
treatments as they become residual claimants of the surplus where as buyers are the residual claimant in the
no bargaining treatments. In addition, because in the partial enforcement condition sellers secure the price,
sellers exercise a higher bargaining power and are more willing to shirk. Therefore, the average delivered
quality is lower in the partial enforcement than in the no enforcement treatments.
Furthermore, the actual quality level and the cost of providing such quality determines the total social
surplus and the sum of seller's and buyer's payos is dened as total private surplus. In the no bargaining
treatments, the sum of seller's and buyer's payos equal the total social surplus. However, in the bargaining
treatments, because of the possibility of counteroers, the total social surplus may dier from the total
private surplus, i.e. the value of the sum of the parties' payos. If the buyer's oer is accepted, bargaining
ends and private and social surplus are dened as above. If the buyer's oer is declined, the seller has
the opportunity to counteroer, but the value of the potential payos for each party shrinks according to
dierent bargaining factors, which means that total social surplus diers from the sum of parties' payos
(private surplus).
The predictions for total social surplus follow the same logic as the ones for the actual quality level.
If subjects develop relational contracts, sellers supply higher levels of quality in the BP treatments as they
become residual claimants of the surplus. As a consequence, a higher level of social surplus is produced in
the bargaining treatments relative to the no bargaining treatments. Furthermore, because sellers secure the
base price in the partial enforcement treatments, the sellers exercise a higher bargaining power in the PE
treatments than in the NE treatments. Then, it is expected that the total social surplus diers more from
the total private surplus in the PB treatment than in the NB treatment (hypothesis 5).
Table 4 shows the average actual quality and surplus in all treatments. The non-parametric analysis
shows that the actual quality supplied in the NB treatment is signicantly higher than all other treatments,
which supports Hypothesis 4. However, actual quality is higher in the no bargaining treatment when partial
enforcement is in place contradicting hypothesis 4, but a Kruskal-Wallis test did not provide evidence of
signicant dierences (p=0.4313) among the average quality provided in the PEBP treatment and the one in
the no bargaining treatments (PN and NN). These results suggests that sellers are not exercising too much
bargaining power in the NEBP as subjects in this treatment reached a signicantly higher quality. These
patterns repeat for social surplus. The average social surplus is signicantly higher in the NEBP treatment
when compared with the other treatments as Hypothesis 4 predicts. In addition, the total social surplus is
the lowest in the PEBP treatment but the KW test did not provide evidence of signicant dierences with
38respect to the PENBP and NENBP treatments (p = 0:4313).
I further explore these results in table 12, 13 and 14. Table 12 shows results for a censored regression
exploring the determinants of actual quality. The explanatory variables include all treatment eects and
controls for learning eects and parties' history. All standards errors are clustered at the pair level.
The coecients for all treatment dummies are signicantly dierent than zero. All control variables
aect signicantly the actual quality delivered, suggesting that the more the parties have previously earned
in the relationship and the longer the relationship the higher the quality delivered. Furthermore, the more
periods subjects play the lower the quality provided, suggesting some learning from playing the game.
A Wald test for the equality of coecients rejects the null hypothesis that the NEBP coecient equals
any of the other treatment dummies coecients (p=0.0074 for NN, p=0.0046 for PB and p=0.0028 for PN
respectively). However, I fail to reject NN=PB, NN=PN and PB=PN (p=0.8525, p=0.7175 and p=0.8201,
respectively). These estimates conrm the non-parametric test results with respect to actual quality.
Furthermore, Table 13 shows the eect of the presence of bargaining and enforcement separately on
the actual quality delivered. The estimation is also a tobit model with actual quality level as dependent
variables and the explanatory variables include the presence of bargaining (dummy taking a value of one
if PEBP or NEBP and 0 otherwise) and enforcement (dummy takes a value of one if PEBP and PENBP
and 0 otherwise) as well as the same control variables as before. The presence of bargaining has a positive
eect on the delivery of quality supporting the hypothesis that sellers' provide a higher level of quality in
the bargaining treatments because they become residual claimants of the surplus. However, the presence of
partial enforcement aects negatively quality provision. The latter result is compatible with the hypothesis
that sellers may deviate from contracts more in the presence of partial enforcement because the price is
enforced by the computer. This potential behavior may also drive parties to trade at lower levels of quality
even when sellers do not deviate. To explore this more in detail, Table 14 shows a summary of average
contracted and actual quality as well as the percentage of trades in which actual quality fell short of the
contracted quality and the average size of quality deviation across treatments.
Table 14 shows that sellers shirk more in the partial enforcement treatment than in the fully incomplete
treatments. More shirking in the PE treatments is consistent with the negative eect that enforcement has
on quality provision shown in the actual quality regression in Table 13. The percentage of trades in which
actual quality is lower than the contracted quality ranges from 38% in the NB treatment to 47% in the PN
treatment; however, a Kruskal-Wallis test cannot reject the null hypothesis that the percentages of trades











Length of relationship 0.3344**
(0.1484)
Buyer previous earnings 0.1286***
(0.0198)


















F(1, 721) statistic for equality 7.46***
of NB and NN coecients p=0.0065
F(1, 721) statistic for equality 0.05
of NN and PB coecients 0.8195
F(1, 721) statistic for equality 0.36
of NN and PN coecients p=0.5482
F(1, 721) statistic for equality 6.93**
of NB and PB coecients p=0.0087
F(1, 721) statistic for equality 10.75**
of NB and PB coecients p=0.0011
F(1, 721) statistic for equality 0.82
of PB and PN coecients p=0.3656
Observations 735
Log pseudolikelihood -1495.5747
Notes: The estimation for actual quality is a tobit model. Asterisks indicate the signicance level of
the estimate: * at 10% level, ** at 5% level and *** at 1% level. Standard errors reported are robust
and adjusted for clustering on buyer-seller pairs. There were 126 left-censored observations at 1 and
246 right censored observations at 10.
Table 12: Actual quality estimates
40Actual Quality Social Surplus Private Surplus
Regressors Coe./Std Error Coe./Std Error Coe./Std Error
Constant -1.5327 5.8907 5.8912
(1.7297) (5.1268) (5.1670)
Bargaining dummy 4.2419*** 13.5078*** 10.1526**
(1.5208) (4.6709) (4.6378)
Enforcement dummy -3.1493** -9.8841** -7.3918
(1.4956) (4.5574) (4.5364)
Bargaining*enforcement -3.5786* -10.7106* -10.4521*
(1.8468) (5.7837) (5.8660)
Length of relationship 0.1511 0.3427 0.3173
(0.1175) (0.2419) (0.2361)
Buyer previous earnings 0.1062*** 0.3135*** 0.3444***
(0.0160) (0.0451) (0.0454)




Observations 735 735 735
Log pseudolikelihood -1442.6996
R-squared 0.3551 0.3338
Notes: The estimation for actual quality is a tobit model. There were 108 left-censored observations
at 1 and 209 right-censored observations at 10. Estimations for social and private surplus are OLS.
Asterisks indicate the signicance level of the estimate: * at 10% level, ** at 5% level and *** at
1% level. Additional controls included dummy variables for session-day. Standard errors reported are
robust and adjusted for clustering on buyer-seller pairs.
Table 13: Actual quality, social surplus and private surplus estimates
41Treatments Av. contracted Av. actual % of trades Av. size of
quality quality where q < Q shortfall, Q-q
NB 8.57 7.51 0.38 1.06
NN 8 6.41 0.46 1.59
PB 7.71 6.05 0.45 1.66
PN 7.79 6.33 0.47 1.46
All bargaining 8.05 6.63 0.42 1.42
All no bargaining 7.90 6.37 0.47 1.52
All partial enforcement 7.75 6.19 0.46 1.56
All no enforcement 8.24 6.87 0.42 1.37
Table 14: Quality deviation summary statistics
The average size of quality shortfall is the smallest in the NEBP treatment as predicted. Again,
a Kruskal-Wallis test cannot reject the null hypothesis that the average size of quality shortfall is the
same across treatments (p=0.1557). Therefore, the frequency and size of quality deviation characterize all
treatments in the same way. Then, even though sellers shirk more in the partial enforcement conditions,
shirking is not statistically dierent among treatments, and therefore shirking does not explain the lower
quality provision in the presence of external enforcement.
The results suggest that in the absence of third-party enforceability, even under the pressure of bar-
gaining, repeated interaction achieves an overall higher eciency. The results support the theory of strategic
ambiguity, which suggests that more incomplete contracts are more ecient when barriers to third-party
enforcement are high. In the case of our experiments, subjects nd more powerful informal incentives when
third-party enforcement is not available and when participants have the option to bargain over the terms of
the contract.
In addition, Table 13 shows the results of OLS regressions for social surplus and private surplus.
Before analyzing these regressions Table 4.3 presents summary statistics on how the average social surplus
relates to average buyer's and seller's payos and to the average private surplus which is the sum of the
private payos. Table 4.3 also presents the average loss of private eciency, which represents the dierence
between the social surplus and the private surplus. In other words, it represents the private loss that parties
incur from bargaining relative to what they could achieve if they were to agree in the rst oer.
For both the NN and PN treatments the average social and private surplus are the same as there is
no bargaining. However, in the NB and PB treatments the average private surplus is lower than the average
social surplus. The average private surplus in the PB treatment is signicantly lower than the average
private surplus in all other treatments (MW p = 0:0001forNB;p = 0:0029forNNandp = 0:0070PN) but
42Treatments Av. Social Av. Private Loss of eciency Av. Buyers' Av. Sellers'
Surplus Surplus due to bargaining payos payos
Only completed contracts
NB 37.53 33.29 -0.113 20.90 12.39
NN 32.07 32.07 0 19.57 12.50
PB 30.26 27.79 -0.082 9.63 18.15
PN 31.67 31.67 0 16.75 14.91
All contracts proposed
NB 25.80 22.80 -0.116 13.28 7.87
NN 19.33 19.33 0 11.80 7.54
PB 22.68 20.82 -0.082 6.24 11.75
PN 21.99 21.99 0 11.63 10.35
Table 15: Social and private surplus summary statistics
it is not signicantly dierent among the remaining three treatments (NB, NN and PN). The average social
and private surplus in the NB treatment is consistently higher than all other treatments, but only the social
surplus is signicantly dierent than the other treatments. By the same token, the average social and
private surplus are the lowest for the PEBP condition; however, it is only signicantly dierent than the
other treatments for the private surplus. This result suggests that bargaining and enforcement may have
dierent eects on social and private surplus. The OLS estimation of the social and private surplus in Table
13 gives more details about these observations.
Column two is the estimation for social surplus and column three has private surplus as the dependent
variable. The explanatory variables include a dummy to account for the eect of bargaining and a dummy
variable for the eect of the enforcement level. Controls for the length of the relationship, buyer's and seller's
previous earnings, day of session eects and period dummies are included. The base line is no bargaining and
no enforcement, which is analogous to the NN treatment. The eects of primary interest are the coecients
for the dummy variables for the presence of bargaining and partial enforcement.
Bargaining has a positive eect on both the social and private surplus, which is consistent with
the hypothesis that bargaining power increases the level of eciency as sellers become residual claimants.
However, the eect is not signicant in the private surplus estimation. On the other hand, the enforcement
coecient are signicant at 1% level; the more enforcement reduces the level of private and social surplus.
This result suggests that when parties engage in relationships that may repeat, more incomplete contracts
achieve higher social eciency and private surplus, consistent with the theory of strategic ambiguity. This
analysis conrms the non-parametric tests results and leads to the next result.
Result 4. Eciency and social surplus are signicantly higher in the NB treatment. When third-party
43enforcement is not available and participants have the option to bargain over the terms of the contract, parties
nd powerful informal incentives that allow for higher eciency and surplus if they are able to engage in
long-term relationships. Then, when bargaining is available, partial formal enforcement is detrimental to
eciency.
Another important observation is that the average loss of private eciency is higher under the NB
treatment than in the PB treatment, reecting that contracts for which bargaining was exercised were more
used in the NB treatment. Then the signicant lower private surplus in the PB condition relative to the NB
treatment is explained by the trade of lower quality levels and not because of higher loss of eciency which
contradicts hypotheses 5. The next result follows:
Result 5. There is a higher loss of private eciency in NB than in the PB treatment.
Moreover, the counteroer acceptance rate was 40% in the NB treatment and 34% in the PB as the
summary statistics show in table 4. However, the exercise of bargaining did not translate to higher seller
payos as on average sellers got higher payos under the PB treatments. The lower seller payos in the
NB treatment may be a reection of buyers' payment decisions and opportunistic bahavior. That is, buyers
renege more in the NEBP treatment than in the PEBP treatment. I explore this in the next section.
4.4 Payment behavior and distribution of surplus
After observing the quality provided, buyers decide to pay according to the contract or to pay something
dierent. If sellers provide a higher quality than the one in the contract, buyers could pay a higher bonus
in the partial enforcement condition or could pay a higher total payment in the fully incomplete contracts.
If the seller supplies a lower quality than the one in the contract or if the buyer decides to deviate from the
contract, the buyer can pay a lower bonus in the PE conditions and adjust the total payment to zero in the
NE conditions.
Hypothesis 4 states that buyers' total payments are greatest in the bargaining treatments. Further-
more, the total payment is greatest in the partial enforcement condition because the buyer can only adjust
downwards the bonus. In addition, the prices are greater in the PB condition than in the PN condition, and
the opposite is true for the bonus.
Table 4 shows that the actual total payment is the highest in the NB treatment and the non-parametric
analysis gives evidence that it is signicantly higher than the total payment in the PB and NN treatments
(at the 10% and 5% levels, respectively). The econometric analysis is shown in table 16 shows that all
44treatments have a signicant eect on the payment outcomes. This analysis conrms the dierence between
the NB and NN treatments (Wald test p=0.0306), but gives no evidence for a signicant dierence among
PB and NB treatments (Wald test p=0.9406). It also gives evidence that PN and PB coecients are
signicantly dierent (Wald tes p=0.0104). This evidence conrms that bargainig treatments lead to higher
total payments relative to the corresponding no bargaining treatments as hypothesis 4 states. Note that the
total payment made decreases with the number of periods subjects play.
To investigate further the eects of bargaining on actual payments I ran censored models for total
payment, price and bonus as dependent variables. The explanatory variables include a dummy for bargaining,
a dummy for the enforcement and controls for pairs' history such as current length of the relationship, buyer's
lagged earnings and seller's lagged earning. I also control for learning eects by including dummy variables
for each period. Table 17 shows the results.
Bargaining has a positive and signicant eect on actual total payment and price. This evidence
supports hypothesis 4 with respect of the eect of bargaining on payment behavior. Bargaining increases
the total payment made and the price paid. Although not signicant bargaining has a negative eect on
bonuses paid.
Result 6. Total payments and prices were higher in the bargaining conditions.
In addition to the eciency and surplus produced, it is important to analyze the division of the gains
from trade between the buyer and the seller. Hypothesis 6 states that in the no bargaining treatments
the buyer captures the entire surplus, leaving the seller with only her reservation payo in each period. In
contrast, hypothesis 6 also states that in the bargaining treatments the seller is able to extract the entire
surplus through bargaining. Although, in experimental settings, it is common to see that subjects share the
surplus to a greater degree than the predicted outcomes derived from a model of rational prot-maximizing
agents. In the case of this experiment, buyers should get a higher proportion of the surplus in the no
bargaining treatments and sellers in the bargaining treatments. However, in the NB treatment sellers get
lower rents than in the PB treatment because if they exercise all bargaining power by extracting all surplus
trade breaks down. Then, they are better o by getting lower rents per period but accumulating rents
through trade in the long-term.
I measure share of surplus three ways: raw share, truncated share and payo relative spread. Table 4
shows each pf these for the seller. Note that in this experiment, the sellers's share of the surplus in the no
bargaining treatments (Table 4) is more than the reservation payo, which contradicts hypothesis 6. These











Length of relationship 1.0218**
(0.4155)
Buyer previous earnings 0.4892***
(0.0854)




















Notes: The estimation for actual total payment is a tobit model.
Asterisks indicate the signicance level of the estimate: * at 10%
level, ** at 5% level and *** at 1% level. Standard errors reported
are robust and adjusted for clustering on buyer-seller pairs.
Table 16: Total payment
46Total payment Price Bonus
Regressors Coe./Std Error Coe./Std Error Coe./Std Error
Constant 24.6634*** 24.8533*** 1.3186
(3.7520) (2.9196) (3.6497)






Length of relationship 1.0218** 1.1579* 0.1746
(0.4155) (0.5950) (0.6466)
Buyer previous earnings 0.4892*** 0.2307** 0.4591***
(0.0854) (0.0903) (0.1349)
Seller previous earnings 0.8717*** 0.3740*** 0.3248***
(0.1012) (0.1048) (0.1239)
p3 -2.5365 -6.8210*** -0.9315
(2.4148) (2.0966) (2.9068)
p4 -3.4121 -6.5769*** -1.0035
(2.5749) (2.4940) (2.9148)
p5 -5.8881* -6.3447* -2.0598
(3.4230) (3.6656) (4.0867)
p6 -10.3953** -15.1703*** -7.1378
(4.4203) (3.7461) (4.8519)
p7 -10.7013** -13.4672** -0.7246
(4.5391) (5.4322) (5.6905)
p8 -9.4057* -18.7800*** -4.5912
(4.7955) (6.1096) (7.5364)
pl -8.4115* -16.3411** -3.7638
(4.4910) (6.6756) (8.2166)
Sigma 22.6719*** 17.2426*** 18.9888***
(0.8155) (0.8636) (2.1278)
Observations 735 411 411
Log pseudolikelihood -3225.0957 -1744.4882 -1256.6361
Pseudo R2 0.0326 0.0203 0.0269
Notes: The estimations are tobit models and used observations from period 2 and above. Total pay-
ment regression used data from all treatments and had 34 left-censored observations at 0; price and
bonus regressions used data only from partial enforcement treatments and have 3 and 149 left-censored
observations at 0 respectively. Asterisks indicate the signicance level of the estimate: * at 10% level,
** at 5% level and *** at 1% level. Standard errors reported are robust and adjusted for clustering on
buyer-seller pairs.
Table 17: Bargaining eect in payments
47The truncated seller's share censors the raw share to be in the unit interval. That is, if the payo
of either party is negative, that party's share is set to 0 and the other party's share is set to one. This
limits the inuence of outliers, which are large in some treatments. This measure of seller's share suggests
that sellers receive a lower proportion of the surplus in the no bargaining treatments: 38% and 50% in
the NN and PN treatments versus 43% and 64% for the NB and PB. Furthermore, according with this
measure sellers also recieved a lower proportion of the surplus in the NEBP treatment, 43%, while in the
PEBP treatment the sellers recieved a 64% share of the surplus. The sharing amount seems to be correlated
with the possibility of bargaining as the truncated sellers' share of the surplus is signicantly higher in
both bargaining treatments relative to the corresponding no bargaining treatment(Table 4). However, the
truncated measure loses additional information due to censoring.
When considering the raw share, the seller's share of the surplus still greater in the PB condition than
in the PN condition, supporting the hypothesis that the presence of bargaining increases the seller's share of
surplus. But this is not the case in the fully incomplete conditions: the seller's share is signicantly lower in
the NB than in the NN. In the absence of any enforcement, bargaining does not increases seller's share of the
surplus. But the payos relative spread is signicantly smaller in the NB than in the NN. The latter result
suggests that bargaining does not increase the seller's share of the surplus in the NB but it does decrease the
dierence in the sellers' and buyers' payos. These observations seem contradictory as eciency is higher
in the NB treatment and therefore if the relative spread between parties' payos gets smaller, then seller's
share of the surplus should increase. A possible explanation may come from dierences in the parties's share
of the surplus after cooperation and deviation under the NB. As a consequence the enforcement level may
have an important eect on how surplus is distributed.
The enforcement level aects positively the share of the surplus that the seller is able to accrue. A
MW test gives evidence to reject the hypothesis that the sellers' share in the PB treatment equals the share
in the NB treatment (p =< 0:0000), and that the share in the NN equals PN (p =< 0:0000). In the no
bargaining treatments, it seems that the smaller payment deviation that buyers can exercise may explain the
dierence in sellers' share of the surplus. By the same token, the dierence in the sellers' share of surplus
among NB and PB may also be explained by the availability of third party enforcement.
Furthermore, the lower sellers' share of surplus in the NB treatment relative to the PB treatment
contrasts with the higher proportion of counteroers that were accepted by buyers, 40% in the NB treatment
and 34% in the PB treatment. This evidence is consistent with the fact that a transfer of bargaining power




Desired quality 7.85 8.81 0:0011***
Desired total payment 61.91 66.09 0.0037***
Actual quality 6.05 7.71 < 0:0001***
Actual Payment 48.79 52.99 0.0086**
Payment shortfall 13.12 13.11 0.0507*
Payment shortfall (median) 5.5 0
Buyer's payo 11.68 24.13 < 0:0001***
Seller's payo 18.55 14.43 0.7899
Social surplus 30.23 38.56 < 0:0001***
Private surplus 30.23 38.56 < 0:0001***
Counteroers=79
Desired quality 7.15 7.22 0.9369
Desired total payment 54.67 69.63 0.021**
Actual quality 6.07 6.37 0.6423
Actual Payment 48.73 33.11 0.0224**
Payment shortfall 5.94 36.52 0.0001***
Buyer's payo 1.20 3.06 0.0535*
Seller's payo 16.51 1.13 0.0045**
Social surplus 30.39 31.85 0.6423
Private surplus 17.72 4.19 0.0058**
Table 18: Test for enforcement eects
of a greater sellers' share of the surplus.
These results contradicts the achievement of higher eciency and lower seller's share in the NEBP
treatment. The question is how the NB causes higher social and private surplus but sellers were not able
to capture a signicantly greater share of the surplus. Perhaps, sellers were more timid in using aggressive
counteroers in the NB treatment because of fear of opportunistic behavior by the buyers. Table 4 presents
the percentage of counteroers per treatment. Sellers use counteroers in only in 24% and 37% of the
possible interactions in the NB and PB treatments respectively, while in 51% and 79 % of the times that
sellers rejected an oer,they couteroered in the NB and PB treatments respectively.
In order to control for the eect of enforcement on the sellers' share of the surplus, I compare contracts
oered by buyers (rst oers) and counteroers from sellers in the bargaining treatments that resulted in
trade. The results are presented in Table 18.
First oers include a higher desired quality than counteroers in both treatments, but the desired
quality is only dierent between oers and counteroers in the PB treatment (p = 0:0026). In addition,
the desired quality level in both oers and counteroers were higher in the NB than in the PB treatment,
however, they are only signicantly dierent for rst oers (p = 0:0011). In addition, desired total payment
49PB NB
Accepted Not Accepted MW (p-value) Accepted Not Accepted MW (p-value)
Oers
Desired quality 7.85 6.54 0.0001*** 8.81 8.33 0:0272**
Desired total payment 61.91 49.19 < 0:0001*** 66.09 56.72 0.0004***
Buyer's payo (Potential) 11.68 16.25 0.0263** 24.13 26.64 0.3937
Seller's payo (Potential) 18.55 16.479 0.100* 14.43 15.04 0.9053
Social surplus (Potential) 30.23 32.72 0.0871 38.56 41.68 0.103
Private surplus (Potential) 30.23 32.72 38.56 41.68
Counteroers
Desired quality 7.15 6.75 0.4816 7.22 7.63 0.8051
Desired total payment 54.67 58.79 0.1157 69.63 65.98 0.5553
Buyer's payo (Potential) 1.20 0.871 0.0529* 3.06 1.03 0.0164**
Seller's payo (Potential) 16.51 22.54 0.0003*** 1.13 25.07 < 0:000***
Social surplus (Potential) 30.39 33.75 0.7106 31.85 38.13 0.2021
Private surplus (Potential) 17.72 23.41 4.19 26.082
PN NN
Oers
Desired quality 7.80 6.63 0.0012*** 8.00 7.52 0:0368**
Desired total payment 57.94 49.54 < 0:0056** 61.72 59.15 0.0757
Buyer's payo (Potential) 16.75 16.71 0.9225 19.57 16.09 0.034**
Seller's payo (Potential) 14.91 16.41 0.5341 12.50 21.53 < 0:0000***
Social surplus (Potential) 31.67 33.13 0.4361 32.07 37.62 0.0010***
Table 19: Bargaining eect in all oers
was signicantly dierent among treatments in both oers and counteroers. However, sellers included a
higher desired price only in the NB, but it is not dierent among oers and counter oers (p = 0:8133).
Meanwhile the desired total payment is signicantly higher for rst oers than for counteroers in the
PB treatment (p = 0:0103). Consequently, counteroers in the NB seem to reect a stronger exercise of
bargaining power because for the same level of quality, sellers ask for a higher price relative to the PB
treatment. However, the payment shortfall is much higher and signicantly dierent in the NB than in the
PB, causing bargaining power to not have much eect on seller's payos as sellers earn an average of 14.43
experimental points when the contracts were reached through a rst oer relative to 1.13 experimental points
when the contracts were made through counteroers (p = 0:0002). In the PB, sellers also got higher payo
through rst oers, but they are not signicantly dierent to payos made through counteroers (p = 0:0951).
Therefore, in the PEBP, the level of enforcement seems to complement the exercise of bargaining power by
sellers.
In addition, in Table 19 I examine the dierence between contracts that were accepted and those
that were not accepted for each treatment. I separate contracts by oers and counteroers in the case of
bargaining treatments and present the potential outcomes for sellers' payos, buyers' payos and social and
private surplus from rejected contracts.
50When comparing bargaining treatments, the average terms in the rejected rst oers were signicantly
lower than the terms included in accepted rst oers in both treatments. Although the terms in the rejected
contracts would only make a dierence for the potential buyer's payo in the PEBP treatment, the result
gives some evidence that buyers had to oer a relatively higher payment for a higher quality in order to have
sellers to accept the contract which may be caused by the potential threat of bargaining. The dierence
between the desired quality level among accepted and rejected contracts is 1.31, which would cost the seller
an additional 6.55 points to supply. The dierence in the desired total payment that buyers oer in the
accepted contracts is 12.72 points. Then, buyers oered in average more than the cost needed to supply the
additional 1.31 units of quality. The same is true for the NEBP treatment. The average dierence in the
quality level in the contract is 0.48 which would cost the sellers 2.4 additional points to supply while the
buyer oered an additional 9.37 points (almost 4 times the additional cost).
When I perform the same comparison between the no bargaining treatments, I nd that the quality
dierence in the PN treatment is 1.17, which would cost 5.85 points and that the additional payment oered
is 8.4 points. In the NN treatment, the dierence in the quality level is also 0.48 (cost= 2.4 points), but
the dierence in the total payment oered is 2.57. Then, the dierence in the payments oered relative to
the average quality requested are bigger in the bargaining treatments, suggesting that bargaining aects the
proposed contracts from the buyer.
When contracts were proposed by the sellers (counteroers), contract terms in the accepted coun-
teroers were not signicantly dierent to the rejected counteroers in terms of social surplus generated
or the potential surplus. However, assuming that the parties would cooperate in the rejected contracts,
the dierences in the terms of the contracts, would lead to a signicantly dierent distribution of surplus
in which the sellers would get higher payos and the buyers would get lower payos. It is interesting to
note that the dierence in the potential sellers' payos is much greater in the NB treatment than in the
PB treatment, suggesting that the lower sellers' payo may come from the opportunistic behavior of the
buyers. It is easy to see that accepted counteroers in the NB included a lower quality for a higher total
payment but result in higher payos for the seller when contracts were made through oers and not through
counteroers. An explanation for this may be that after sellers exercise their bargaining power by making
a counteroer, the buyer withholds the majority of the total payment giving his ability to adjust the total
payment to zero in the fully incomplete condition. Then, the seller's payo is not only signicantly reduced
by the bargaining factor applied to the payos but also for the lack of payments from the buyer. In contrast,
in the PB treatment buyers can only withhold part of the total payment, and as Table 4 shows the majority
51of the payment is oered as the enforceable base payment. Therefore, the enforcement of the base price
insures the seller can exercise bargaining power and avoid opportunistic behavior which is not the case in
the NB treatment.
Moreover, the poor eect that bargaining power has in the NB on the sellers' share of the surplus
occurs for two reasons. First, buyers may behave more opportunistically after accepting a counteroer
because of the absence of enforcement which gives them opportunity to withhold the full payment. Second,
sellers may also be reneging and after observing this deviation, buyers punish the sellers by withholding the
full payment. In contrast, buyers have less incentive to withhold payment in the PB, because the buyer can
only punish by withholding the bonus, which decreases the buyer's potential gains from deviation. Then,
the enforcement level complements the seller's bargaining power and allows the seller to get a higher share
of the surplus.
Estimation results in Table 20 support the idea that enforcement complements the exercise of bargain-
ing power. The presence of bargaining and more enforcement has positive eects on seller payos, although
only enforcement has a signicant eect. The eect of enforcement and bargaining is also positive on the
seller's share of the surplus, but in this case, bargaining also has a signicant eect. In addition, bargaining
and enforcement have a negative and signicant eect on the relative dierence between buyer's and seller's
payos.
The experimental results give evidence that parties share rents in all treatments, contradicting the
hypothesis that in the no bargaining treatments buyers claim all surplus and sellers only get reservation
payos. Furthermore, the combination of bargaining and partial enforcement results in higher seller payos
and share of surplus while only bargaining does not increase signicantly seller payos. However, bargaining
decreases the dierence in payos between buyers and sellers when enforcement is fully absent. These results
are summarized as follows.
Result 7. Seller payos and share of the surplus are higher than the reservation payo in the no bargain-
ing treatments. Bargaining decreases the dierence between buyer and seller payos. Greater enforcement
increases seller's rents and share of the surplus, and bargaining increases both if enforcement is in place.



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































534.5 Cooperation, opportunistic behavior, punishment and bargaining
Hypothesis 3 states that more cooperative outcomes are observed in PB, PN and NN treatments than in
the NB treatment. If parties agree to trade, cooperation is dened as both parties meeting their obligations
according to the agreed contract. Table 4 5 shows that cooperation is signicantly higher in the NB treatment
than in the other treatments. Cooperation levels across the other three treatments are not dierent from
one another.
These results contradicts hypothesis 3 because as sellers exercise bargaining power in the NB treat-
ment, trade was predicted to break down more often. However, the result is consistent with th fact that if
parties use informal incentives to maintain a relationship in which parties share rents more equally, then the
rate of cooperation may be higher in the NB treatments than in the other treatments.
Following the theoretical model and the parameters used, cooperation is an equilibrium outcome for
all treatments but the NB treatment if sellers exercise maximal bargaining power available. Therefore, an
underlying assumption of the theoretical model is that cooperation should occur from the initial period of the
partnership in the NN, PB and PN treatments. That means that a greater number of trades relative to total
oers should be observed in these three treatments than in the NB treatment as well as more cooperative
outcomes with respect to parties meeting contract terms. Furthermore, greater contract acceptance and
cooperation should be observed in the no bargaining treatments than in the bargaining treatments as subjects
may test the use of bargaining in the initial periods even though theoretically a counteroer should only be
observed o the equilibrium path.
To analyze this I look at initial cooperation by restricting the data to include those partnerships that
exhibit cooperation in the rst period. Full initial cooperation is dened as the seller accepting the buyer's
oer (does not counteroer in the BP treatments) followed by both parties meeting the contract obligations
in the rst period of the partnership (regardless of actions in later periods). Only 67 pairs out of 297 pairs in
the data met this criterion. Note that this partition of data is shown in Table 4.5 and it includes counteroers
and their outcomes from period two and after.
Among initial cooperators, there is not a signicant dierence in contract terms and outcomes be-
tween the bargaining and the no bargaining treatments within the same enforcement level. However, initial
cooperators within the same bargaining conditions obtain signicantly dierent results across enforcement
regimes. Although contract terms used by initial cooperators between NB and NN and between PB and PN
are not signicantly dierent, all outcomes but buyer payos are signicantly higher in the no enforcement
conditions than in the partial enforcement regimes. The contracted and actual quality levels are still lower
54than the theoretical prediction of 10 (Wilcoxon test results in a signicant dierence at standard levels ),
however, initial cooperators are able to achieve higher levels of eciency and a more even distribution of the
surplus in the complete absence of third party enforcement than when there is partial third-party enforce-
ment for the same bargaining condition. The higher level of eciency results in a higher surplus which allows
parties to redistribute the gains from trade in way that gives higher payos for the sellers without changing
buyer payos. Furthermore, the dierence between social and private surplus in the bargaining treatments
is minimal among cooperators, suggesting that sellers that are engage in a cooperative relationship rarely
resort to the use of counteroers.
The achievement of greater eciency and better outcomes among cooperators in the absence of third
party enforcement supports once again the theory of strategic ambiguity.In the absence of formal enforcement,
parties use cooperation and good faith (informal incentives) to achieve higher eciency than when there is
some formal enforcement.
In addition, Table 4.5 shows that initial cooperators are able to achieve higher eciency and average
payos for sellers and buyers across experimental regimes than those that do not cooperate in the rst period
of the relationship. The dierence between social and private surplus is higher among non-cooperators than
among cooperators, which suggests that sellers in pairs that initially did not cooperate exercised greater
bargaining power than those sellers in pairs that initially cooperated. The lower average social surplus
among non-cooperators reduces the average payos for both sellers and buyers. Although the dierence in
buyer and seller payos between cooperators and non-cooperators is signicant at standard levels, sellers
within the group of subjects that did not initially cooperate, present a higher drop in their average payos
than the buyers in the no enforcement treatments. This result suggests that buyers in pairs that did not
cooperate initially withheld an important proportion of the total payment and that allowed them to keep
a greater proportion of the available surplus. Then, absent of third-party enforcement, bargaining did not
assure a higher payment for the seller. In fact, regardless of the signicantly higher social eciency in the NB,
neither seller or buyer average payos were dierent between the bargaining and no bargaining treatments
when contract enforcement was absent and when parties did not initially cooperate. This follows from the
fact that private surplus is not dierent between NB and NN among non-cooperators.
In contrast, in the presence of bargaining and partial enforcement, a higher proportion of the eciency
loss translates into a greater drop in buyer payos. Within non-cooperators bargaining insures sellers against
a higher drop in payos relative to buyers, through achieving a safer payments structure with a higher base































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































56was 20.35). Then, the seller receives a lower punishment from the buyer if he defects or a lower impact from
the buyer's deviation because the buyer was only able to withhold the bonus. This contrasts with the case of
partial enforcement and no bargaining, in which non-cooperators achieve a more even distribution of surplus
relative to the case of bargaining, where buyers get signicantly greater payos and sellers get signicantly
lower payos with respect to PB. Despite the more even distribution of surplus, eciency and payos are
signicantly lower than the same outcomes achieved by initial cooperators.
The pattern of higher eciency in the no enforcement treatments relative to the partial enforcement
treatments is also consistent among the non-cooperators when bargaining is present. However, even though
social surplus is signicantly higher in the NB treatment than the PB treatment, the distribution of the
private surplus is quite dierent. Among non-cooperators, bargaining aects the distribution of the surplus
as buyers get signicantly higher payos when enforcement is totally absent and sellers get signicantly
higher payos when partial enforcement is in place. A possible explanation is that among non-cooperators
bargaining triggers more opportunistic behavior and buyers are able to defect more when enforcement is
absent. Furthermore, sellers get higher payos than buyers when partial enforcement is in place because
sellers are able to renege and suer a lower possible punishment. The actual total payment in the partial
enforcement treatment with bargaining is signicantly higher than when there is no bargaining. This again
results from the structure of the contract in which the bulk of the payment is allocated to the enforceable
base payment. Then, among non-cooperators when bargaining is present, the enforcement level reinforces
the opportunities for deviation or punishment, for buyers in the no enforcement treatment and for sellers in
the partial enforcement treatment.
Additionally, among non-cooperators in treatments with no enforcement, parties only reach higher
eciency when bargaining is an option. Among no bargaining treatments, there is no dierence in eciency
across enforcement regimes. A possible explanation is that non-cooperative parties are obligated to cooperate
more when bargaining is an option. Therefore, among non-cooperating parties, the theory of strategic
ambiguity holds when bargaining puts pressure on the relationship.
Result 8. Cooperation is the highest in the NB treatment. Cooperators use informal incentives and achieve
higher eciency and a more even distribution of surplus in the absence of formal enforcement. Among non-
cooperators when bargaining is present, the enforcement level reinforces the opportunities for deviation or
punishment, for buyers in the no enforcement treatment and for sellers in the partial enforcement treatment.
Then, bargaining aects the distribution of the surplus such that buyers get signicantly higher payos when
enforcement is totally absent and sellers get signicantly higher payos when partial enforcement is in place.
57Parties may not cooperate in several ways. Given the bargaining game in the model, full cooperation
is dened as parties agreeing on contract terms through a buyer's oer and both parties meeting contract
obligations. Following this denition, parties do not cooperate either if sellers use counteroers or if either
buyer or seller deviates from the relational contract. If the buyer oers the seller a contract which would
not give her high enough payos, she may reject the contract and not trade in the no bargaining treatments
or counteroer in the bargaining treatments.
Furthermore, subjects deviate from the agreed contract either because they behave opportunistically
or because they are punishing the trading partner for previous deviations. If a buyer defects by reneging on
the promised discretionary payment (either bonus or full payment) after the seller has supplied the promised
quality, then the seller may punish the opportunistic behavior from the buyer in the subsequent periods. If
the seller deviates and supplies a lower quality than promised, then the buyer may punish the seller in the
current and subsequent periods. Punishment can take various forms depending on which party is penalizing.
If the seller has deviated, the buyer can withhold the bonus in partial enforcement treatments or the full
discretionary payment in the no enforcement treatments. This punishment from the buyer's side is predicted
in the theoretical model as it is included in dynamic compatibility constraint which allows parties to sustain
a relational contract.
In addition, if either party deviates, punishment may be observed as a no exchange in future periods
(termination of the relationship) or continuing trading on less favorable terms including more deviation.
The theoretical model provides predictions with respect to both forms of punishments. In the full absence
of enforcement treatments (NB and NN) and in the PB treatment, any deviation leads to a termination
of the relationship and no future trade. Theoretically, after a deviation the buyer cannot promise any
payment nor can the seller promise delivery of any quality higher that the minimum level. In the partial
enforcement treatment with no bargaining, the model predicts that parties keep trading by using only the
base payment as a formal incentive (as it is enforceable). Although the buyer can promise a base price after
any deviation, the seller can not promise quality higher than the minimum level, therefore parties trade using
less favorable terms, specically the lowest level of quality and the minimum base payment that meets the
seller's participation constraint.
Table 22 presents a comparison of the seller's acceptance rate and counteroer use following periods
in which the seller performed as promised and the buyer either conformed by paying what was promised or
deviated by paying less.
The dierences among treatments in seller's use of punishments seems to be consistent with the model
58NB PB NN PN
Buyer performed 0.75 0.72 0.85 0.88
Buyer deviated 0.42 0.47 0.60 0.70
Counteroer Buyer performed 0.13 0.18 na na
Counteroer Buyer deviated 0.25 0.31 na na
Table 22: Seller's Subsequent Acceptance Rates and Use of Counteroers Indicating Punishment
predictions. In treatments NB and NN, the prediction is no exchange after observing a deviation. The sellers'
acceptance rate after a buyer deviation is lower than the acceptance rate after buyer performance. This result
is also consistent with the fact that sellers counteroer more when the buyer deviates in comparison to when
the buyer performs. The use of counteroers after deviation is smaller in the NB treatment than in the PB
treatment, which again is consistent with a lower exchange in the fully incomplete contract treatment than
in the partial enforcement treatment. That is, parties resort to termination instead of counteroering and
engaging in trade. In contrast, in the PN treatment, the prediction is that parties trade under less favorable
terms. In both PN and PB, the dierence in seller acceptance rates is smaller which suggests that sellers
used termination less in these treatments.
However, this comparison does not include the fact that contracts used after deviation may be less
attractive to seller. I estimate a probit model for the probability of the seller accepting a contract and using
a counteroer (when it is possible) in periods after the seller has performed as promised (Table 23). The
explanatory variables for the probability of seller acceptance included the terms of the contract oered by the
buyer (price, bonus and quality level), dummy variables for treatment eects, seller earnings in the previous
period, duration of the relationship at that point and a dummy variable for whether the buyer deviated
from the contract in the period before. The eect of primary interest is for the latter variable, which is also
interacted with dummy variables for the treatment. The dummy variable for PN is dropped and it becomes
the baseline for comparison. In the case of the probability of using a counteroer, the observations used
are limited to the bargaining treatments, and the explanatory variables included were the same as for the
probability of seller's acceptance, with the exception that it only included a dummy for the NB treatment
and the PB became the baseline for comparison. The variable of interest is a dummy variable indicating
whether the buyer deviated in the previous period, which is also interacted with the NB dummy variable. I
control for learning eects by including dummy variables for each period from one to eight and thereafter.
59Probability of accepting contract Probability of using counteroer
Regressors Coecients/Std Error Coecients/Std Error
Constant -0.0022 0.4334
(0.3383) (0.8482)
Contracted price 0.0418*** -0.0442***
(0.0098) (0.0154)
Contracted bonus 0.0291*** -0.0380**
(0.0100) (0.0153)
Contracted quality -0.1520** 0.1265
(0.0676) (0.1034)
NB dummy -0.7907*** -0.2293
(0.2952) (0.2767)
Buyer previous deviation -0.4349 0.4062
(0.3605) (0.3621)










Seller previous earnings 0.0171*** 0.0004
(0.0056) (0.0086)
Length of relationship 0.1127** 0.1420
(0.0483) (0.3620)
Observations 409 194
Log pseudolikelihood -190.3251 -91.333943
Pseudo R2 0.1973 0.1750
Notes: Estimation are probit models with a dummy that takes value of 1 if the contract was accepted
or counteroer was used respectively and zero otherwise as dependent variables respectively. Asterisks
indicate the signicance level of the estimate: * at 10% level, ** at 5% level and *** at 1% level.
Additional controls are current length of the relationship, seller payos and dummies for each period.
Standard errors reported are robust and adjusted for clustering on buyer-seller pairs. Both estimations
use subdata for only oers made by buyers. In addition, estimation for probability of counteroers
limits data to bargaining treatments.
Table 23: Probability of seller's acceptance
60NB PB NN PN
Seller performed 0.11 0.25 0.33 0.23
Seller deviated 0.93 0.94 0.94 0.93
Seller performed after counteroer 0.65 0.51 na na
Seller deviated after counteroer 1 0.80 na na
Table 24: Fraction of Buyer's Withholding Payment Indicating Punishment
Higher payment terms increase the probability of the seller accepting the contract and decrease the
probability of the seller counteroering in the bargaining treatments. None of the estimated coecients
for the buyer's deviation were signicant and a Wald test did not reject that all coecients related to this
variable in both regressions were jointly equal to zero (p=0.5707 and p=0.5329 respectively). These results
contradict the assumption that sellers use rejection and counteroers to punish deviating buyers. If rejecting
oers or using counteroers are not a credible threat then buyers have more incentives to withhold payments
even after satisfactory seller performances. This behavior weakens the eectiveness of the use of informal
incentives to achieve higher quality outcomes. In addition, the opportunity of a counteroer decreases
substantially the probability of the seller accepting a contract oered by a buyer. This result suggests that
sellers use rejection to exercise bargaining power more than to punish deviating buyers.
Table 24 compares the buyers' decision to withhold promised payments, depending on whether the
seller delivered contracted quality or not and if the contract was made through an oer or a counteroer.
As expected, buyers withheld discretionary payments more frequently after deviation by the seller
than after conforming behavior in all treatments when contracts where oers and counteroers. However,
buyers withheld payments more often when the seller's performance was observed in contracts derived from
counteroers. This result suggests that buyers withheld payments as a mean to punish sellers for exercising
bargaining power. Furthermore, the amount of payment withheld was more severe in the fully incomplete
treatment than in the partial enforcement treatment. This suggests that seller were more successful in
exercising bargaining power in the partial enforcement treatments than in the fully incomplete treatments.
In order to analyze buyer behavior more fully, I estimated a probit model for the probability of the
buyer paying less than what was promised. Each buyer should weight his expected payos in future periods
under the relational contract and compare it to the short-term gains from deviating from the promised
payment and then receiving stage payos in all other periods.
To estimate this I include as explanatory variables the buyer's value for the quality actually delivered
by the seller in the current period, the promised price and bonus, dummy variables for treatment eects,
61with PN as the baseline for comparison, a dummy variable for whether the seller shirked and a dummy
variable for whether the contract was reached through an oer or not. I also included variables to capture
partnership history, such as the buyer's prior period prots and the duration of the relationship. I control
for learning eects by using dummy variables for each period.
Table 25 presents the results of this estimation. The estimates for V(Q), price, bonus and seller's
previous deviation are all signicant and have the expected direction. These coecients suggest that buyers
actually respond to the terms of the contract and that seller performance acts as an indicator for future gains
from the relationship. The higher the quality delivered the lower the incentive the buyer has to deviate. In
contrast the higher the promised payment the higher the probability that the buyer withhold some of that
payment. More importantly, the results indicate that buyers withhold discretionary payments as a response
to seller shirking and withhold the payments less often when the seller accepted the oer instead of using a
counteroer. Furthermore, the theoretical predictions suggest that the buyer behaves more opportunistically
in the fully incomplete treatments and especially in the NB treatment as cooperation is not an equilibrium
for the parameters used if sellers exercise full bargaining power. A Wald test rejects the hypothesis that
all the treatment eects were equal (p=0.0329). This result is consistent with the ndings that indicate
that the sellers did not use rejection as a punishment mechanism but more as a bargaining mechanism. If
buyers expect that sellers will not increase rejection rates in response to withholding of payment behavior,
then there is not much dierence in the stage games among treatments. However, withholding payment is
consistent with the use of counteroers from the seller.
Additionally, buyers could punish seller's deviation by terminating the relationship. However, as table
4 shows, buyers oer contracts to sellers in almost all possible interactions. The few times that buyers did
not oer contracts to sellers were mostly after no trade was performed. This suggests that buyers do not
withhold oers as a response to seller deviation. Therefore, terminating the relationship does not seem to
occur as the theoretical model assumes for the NB and NN treatments.
Buyers can also punish sellers for low performance by oering contracts with less attractive terms.
In the partial enforcement treatments, after a deviation, parties can only credible trade the lowest level of
quality in exchange for a xed price that satises the seller's participation constraint.
Table 26 compares the terms of oers and counteroers made in periods following cooperation by both
parties and deviation by one or both parties. Note that there were very few observations (37 out of 403,
9%) in which after a seller's deviation that the buyer did not withhold the discretionary payment. This is
consistent with the previous observation that buyers withheld payment to punish seller deviations.




















Buyer's previous earnings -0.0088*
(0.0048)





Notes: Estimation is a probit model with a dummy that takes value of 1 if buyer withholds payments
and zero otherwise as dependent variable. Asterisks indicate the signicance level of the estimate: * at
10% level, ** at 5% level and *** at 1% level. Additional controls are current length of the relationship,
buyer's payos and dummies for each period. Standard errors reported are robust and adjusted for
clustering on buyer-seller pairs.
Table 25: Probability that a buyer withhold payment
63The subset of data in table 26 shows consistent patterns across treatments. Oered quality and
total payment decrease after any deviation compared to contracts oered after periods where cooperation is
observed. Across all treatments, quality requests drop the most after sellers conformed but buyers shirked.
When only buyers deviate the total payment proposed drops the most in the bargaining treatments, while in
the no bargaining treatments total payment drops the most when it is only the seller who deviated. These
observations may be the result of the dierence in bargaining power. In the no bargaining treatments the
buyers, after a seller's deviation, oer the sellers less attractive contracts than when it was the buyer that
deviated. This is consistent with punishing the deviating seller by oering contracts with less attractive
terms of trade after a deviation. In contrast in the bargaining treatments, after a seller's deviation, the
buyer may feel the need to provide more incentives and therefore more attractive contract terms to entice
the seller to performing and forgo the use of counter oers. Then, the presence of bargaining power may
serve as insurance for deviating sellers against buyer's punishment via less attractive terms.
In the partial enforcement treatments, the structure of compensation also changes depending on
previous behavior. In PB and PN, the price decreases and the bonus increases after any deviation. The
dierent balance between price and bonus may be seen as the buyer adjusting payments between formal and
informal incentives. After any deviation, then, contracts reect more informal than formal incentives. This
is especially true when both parties have deviated as the price is the lowest and the bonus is the highest,
regardless of the bargaining condition.
Table 27 presents an econometric investigation of how oer terms change following buyer or seller
deviations. All regressions are tobit estimations for oered quality, oered total payment, oered price
and oered bonus respectively. The estimations for oered price and bonus only include observations for
the partial enforcement treatments in which the price and bonus have dierent enforcement levels. In all
estimations the regressors included dummy variables for treatment eects (only PB in the oered price and
bonus estimations), dummy variables for whether the buyer and the seller shirked in the previous period and
deviation dummies interacted with treatment eects. I also control for partnership history by including the
length of the relationship, buyer's previous earnings and period dummies.
In general, the results are consistent with the observations made in table 26. The requested quality
decreases after a deviation by the buyer while the coecient for seller deviation is positive but insignicant at
standard levels showing no signicant correlation with the seller's previous behavior. Variation in the oered
total payment does not seem to correlate much with parties' previous behavior, only in the NB treatment













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































65Oered quality Oered total payment Oered price Oered bonus
Regressors Coe./Std Error Coe./Std Error Coe./Std Error Coe./Std Error
Constant 7.8674*** 50.8274*** 27.2007*** 24.3385***
(0.7319) (2.8177) (2.4049) (2.6135)
NB dummy 1.9570** 7.8191**
(0.7588) (3.6756)
Seller shirked dummy 0.1451 -0.6291 1.3607 -1.7485
(0.3611) (3.0916) (1.9102) (3.0872)
NB*Seller shirked -0.3095 0.0921
(0.5353) (3.8829)
NN dummy 0.5883 6.6665*
(0.7812) (3.5346)
NN*Seller shirked -0.4985 -0.9440
(0.5164) (3.6102)
PB dummy 0.1240 2.9134 6.6447** -2.6603
(0.7572) (3.6623) (2.9811) (3.7103)
PB*Seller shirked 0.5310 3.8293 -1.7885 5.8340*
(0.5027) (3.5491) (2.3254) (3.4750)
Buyer's previous earnings 0.0604*** 0.2407*** 0.3501*** 0.0318
(0.0135) (0.0485) (0.0848) (0.0707)
Length of relationship -0.0335 -0.0978 0.1704 -0.7931
(0.1474) (0.7025) (0.7614) (1.0686)
p3 0.0474 1.7999 -3.4401* 5.5446***
(0.3438) (1.5188) (1.7661) (1.9564)
p4 -0.1217 0.8713 -6.2784*** 2.8637
(0.4316) (2.0133) (2.4251) (2.6824)
p5 0.2457 5.7368** -5.9290* 9.7851**
(0.5965) (2.9189) (3.3754) (4.5340)
p6 -1.2290 -3.2902 -13.3041*** 4.5801
(0.7789) (3.4238) (4.3873) (5.4337)
p7 -0.7591 -2.0343 -12.3469** 11.1608
(0.9400) (4.2233) (5.5373) (6.9111)
p8 0.0378 2.3615 -13.6689** 19.9566*
(1.1051) (4.9571) (5.8068) (10.3600)
pl 0.2804 3.6600 -10.6762 17.3268*
(1.3828) (6.5377) (7.2091) (9.9484)
Sigma cons 4.1392*** 21.2662*** 18.3381*** 22.8275***
(0.2465) (0.9304) (0.8295) (1.6985)
Observations 1156 1156 617 617
Log pseudolikelihood -2238.8042 -5151.396 -2593.4998 -2705.9213
Pseudo R2 0.0237 0.0084 0.0206 0.0057
Notes: Estimations are tobit models. In the oered quality estimations there were 46 left-censored observations at 1; in the
oered total payment, oered price and oered bonus there were 7, 24 and 29 left-censored observations at 0; there was 1 right-
censored observation at 170 in the oered total payment estimation. Asterisks indicate the signicance level of the estimate: *
at 10% level, ** at 5% level and *** at 1% level. Adiditional controls are current lengh of the relationship, buyer's payos and
dummies for each period. Standard errors reported are robust and adjusted for clustering on buyer-seller pairs.
Table 27: Oers terms after deviation
66Finally, there is not much evidence either that parties' previous behavior aects the price and bonus oered.
Note that a buyer's previous earnings correlates positively with the total payment, quality and price oered
in the following period, and these results are statistically signicant. It also relates in the same way with
the bonus oered but the coecient is not signicant at standard levels.
Table 28 compares the outcomes of parties' exchange in periods after cooperation or deviation behavior.
As before, the buyer generally withholds payment if the seller deviated. The actual quality delivered and
total payments were lower after periods in which deviation was observed than after periods when parties
cooperated. The theoretical model predicts that after any deviation exchange should cease in the fully
incomplete treatments. However, subjects manage to keep trading in all treatments after deviation, under
less attractive terms and achieving a lower social and private surplus.
Table 29 presents the results of the econometric analysis of the exchange outcomes following coop-
eration or deviation by one or both parties. The rst column shows a tobit estimation for actual quality
delivered. The second column shows an OLS estimation for seller share over all treatments. Explanatory
variables included dummy variables for treatment eects with PN as a baseline for comparison, variables
describing deviation behavior from each party in the previous period and interacted terms. Finally, I include
variables related to partnership history such as length of the relationship and seller and buyer earnings in
the period before and dummy variables for each period.
The results are consistent with patterns observed in Table 28. Actual quality falls following buyer
deviation. Furthermore, a Wald test rejects the null hypotheses that the total eects of buyer deviation on
actual quality is zero (p=0.0001). Additionally, although seller deviation does not seem to aect the delivery
of quality, a Wald test rejects the null hypothesis that the total eect of seller deviation is zero (p=0.065).
Moreover, column two gives some evidence about how surplus is distributed between parties after
deviation or cooperation. Although the coecients for dummies indicating previous deviation from the
buyer and the seller have the right sign, they are not signicant; hence, the results do not support the
hypothesis that parties punish by redistributing the surplus away from the deviating party. In fact, in the
NB treatment the interaction with these variables tells the opposite story. When the buyer has deviated in
the previous period the seller's share of the surplus signicantly decreases while if it is the seller who has
deviated in the previous period, the seller's share of the surplus increases. These observation may support
the argument that deviation may be used by parties as a means to exercise their bargaining power. If the
buyer deviated in the period before as a show of bargaining power, in the next period he gets a higher





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































68surplus with the seller so that they exchange and receive the benets of trading. Note that the eect of
buyer deviation is stronger than seller deviation in both magnitude and signicance.
The dierence between the assumptions used to generate theoretical predictions and the observed
subjects' behavior with respect to cooperation and punishment may explain why some predictions of the
model did not hold. This is true especially in the case of the NB treatment in which cooperation is observed
more often than predicted. One important observation is that neither buyers nor sellers terminate the
relationship as a punishment after a deviation in any treatment. Subjects understand that if they terminate
the relationship they also punish themselves because they are tied to the same partner until the experiment
ends and therefore, they would miss the opportunity to earn additional points during the experimental
session. In contrast, parties are more willing to use methods of punishment that do not cost them anything
such as withholding payments in the same period. Note that this may be an artifact of the experimental
design as parties are forced to keep trading with the same party because of the matching procedure.
Result 9. After deviation parties trade under less favorable contract terms in all treatments. Buyer withhold
payments more often in the NB treatment, which reduces seller's payos and seller's share of the surplus.
5 Conclusion
This paper uses experiment to study how bargaining aects the formation of self-enforcing agreements and
parties' reciprocal actions in the marketplace. I implement four treatments in which subjects played a
game with an uncertain number of periods and the parts of the contract (i.e. xed component of payment,
discretionary payment and quality) that were exogenously enforced by the experimenter or the bargaining
power that subjects are able to exercise diered.
The observed behavior in the experiments supports many hypothesis derived from Cordero Salas
(2010) while it also presents results that contrast with the predictions of that model.
Buyers oer more attractive contracts to sellers when sellers can exercise bargaining power. This is
specially true when contract enforcement is completely absent. When contracts are not enforceable at all
and bargaining is in place, subjects trade using contracts that create the highest level of surplus, suggesting
that parties nd informal incentives to maintain a higher eciency in the absence of enforcement, which
supports the strategic ambiguity theory of Bernheim and Whinston (1998).
69Surplus Seller share
OLS Robust reg.
Regressors Coecients/Std Error Coecients/Std Error
Constant 25.3690*** 0.4114***
(3.6997) (0.0468)
NB dummy 6.7538*** 0.0491
(2.5260) (0.0446)
Buyer withheld dummy -8.2203** 0.1604***
(3.4559) (0.0543)
NB*Buyer withheld 8.1818 -0.4538***
(9.4128) (0.1307)
Seller shirked dummy -1.7018 -0.0995*
(2.4631) (0.0547)
NB* Seller shirked -8.0895 0.2528*
(9.6332) (0.1332)
NN dummy 1.8770 -0.0310
(2.4100) (0.0392)
NN*Buyer withheld 0.5640 -0.2048***
(4.3556) (0.0725)
NN* Seller shirked -4.2438 0.0140
(3.8722) (0.0739)
PB dummy 1.9716 0.0432
(2.6700) (0.0411)
PB*Buyer withheld -3.8203 0.1725**
(5.4798) (0.0776)
PB* Seller shirked 0.6549 -0.0405
(5.1337) (0.0797)
Buyer's previous earnings 0.3911*** -0.0006
(0.0683) (0.0008)
Seller's previous earnings 0.3817*** 0.0042***
(0.0749) (0.0009)




Notes: Estimations are OLS and robust regression respectively. Asterisks indicate the signicance
level of the estimate: * at 10% level, ** at 5% level and *** at 1% level. Adiditional controls are
current lengh of the relationship, buyer and seller payos and dummies for each period. Data used
excluded observations for rst period. Standard errors reported are robust and adjusted for clustering
on buyer-seller pairs.
Table 29: Exchange outcomes after deviation
70When partial enforcement is in place subjects use more eciency wage contracts when bargaining
is in place and more performance contracts when bargaining is not possible as predicted. Eciency wage
contracts are not only used to avoid shirking but to minimize the use of bargaining, while in the absence of
bargaining, contracts are only structured to provide incentives to avoid deviations. Furthermore, contract
acceptance rates are lower when bargaining is allows, suggesting that parties use counteroers when they
have the option and they feel that the contract oered is not giving them enough rents. However, sellers
use more counteroers when enforcement is in place supporting the argument that participants are more
comfortable exercising bargaining power when they have part of the payment enforced.
The observations also present unexpected results regarding cooperation. Surprisingly, subjects achieved
the highest level of cooperation among all treatments when contract enforcement was completely lacking and
bargaining was an option which contradicts the model predictions. This result suggests that sellers exercised
less bargaining power than was available in this treatment. Although a higher eciency and total payments
were observed under these conditions, sellers did not get a signicantly hilgher payo or signicantly greater
share of the surplus. This is explained by the stronger buyer's deviation and lower seller's deviation observed
when cooperation was not the outcome. This behavior was deeper when contracts were reached through
counteroers suggesting that buyers also punish sellers for exercising their bargaining power.
In contrast, when partial enforcement was in place bargaining allowed sellers to achieve higher payos
and a greater share of the surplus. Although eciency outcomes were not signicantly dierent relative to
other treatments, they were the lowest in absolute terms suggesting that there might be a trade-o between
distributional and eciency outcomes.
The distributional outcomes suggest that if the goal of improving bargaining position of the weaker
party is to increase their share of the surplus, then shifting bargaining power needs to be complemented
by the implementation of formal enforcement at least the base price . However, if the goal is to improve
eciency when contract enforcement is incomplete, the results give evidence that implementing bargaining
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